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Abstract
There is widespread concern that incentive mechanisms based on past performance may
hinder entry in procurement markets. We report results from a laboratory experiment as-
sessing this concern. Within a simple dynamic procurement game where suppliers compete
on price and quality we study how an incentive mechanism based on past performance affects
outcomes and entry rates. Results indicate that some past-performance based mechanisms
indeed hinder entry, but when appropriately designed may significantly increase both entry
and quality provision without increasing costs to the procurer.
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1 Introduction
Do selection criteria based on past performance deter entry in procurement markets? If buyers
are allowed to formally consider suppliers’ track records, does this necessarily hinder the ability
of new firms, those with little or no performance history, to win contracts?
Understanding how procurement markets should be designed is a first order concern for
firms and governments. Public procurement alone accounts for 15 to 20 percent of GDP in
developed countries and is on the rise as continuing budget shortages cause governments to
rely more and more on private providers. Private procurement is even larger and each well run
firm has a system to evaluate and reward supplier past performance, typically with a preference
in the allocation of new supply contracts. Given the economic importance of procurement
markets, the lack of consensus among policy and law makers around the world on fundamental
questions like the consequences and appropriateness of allowing current contracts to depend on
past performance is surprising.
In the US, for example, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires government
agencies to record contractors’ past performance in a common database and to take it into
account when awarding new contracts.1 This policy was introduced by the Federal Procurement
Streamlining Act (1994) with the intention of making public procurement less bureaucratic and
more effective, closer to private procurement practices, but has recently drawn criticism. Several
prominent US senators voiced their concern that the extensive use of past performance scores
at the contractor selection stage could hinder the ability of new or small businesses to enter into
and win competitions for public contracts.2 The debate led the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to study dozens of procurement decisions across multiple government agencies
in 2011. The resulting report, while inconclusive, contains some intriguing support for the
senators’ concern.3 Despite extensive and costly policies aimed at fostering small business’
access to US procurement markets,4 the report “. . . identified only one procurement in which
offerors . . . lacked relevant past performance.”
On the other side of the pond, European regulators appear to have always been convinced
that allowing the use of past performance indicators as criteria for selecting among contractors
leads to manipulations in favor of local incumbents, hindering entry, cross-border procurement
and common market integration—the main objective of the EU. For this reason EU Procurement
Directives prohibited taking suppliers’ track records into account when comparing their bids,
1See, e.g., Manuel (2015), a non-technical Congressional Research Service report available for download at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41562.pdf.
2The concerns emerged in the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the US Senate,
leading to a formal request of information to the GAO signed by Senators Lieberman and Tester, respectively
Chairman and member of that Committee. The first page clarifies that the GAO 2011 report is a direct response
to the specific request of information by the US Senators.
3See Government Accountability Office (2011). The inquiry had a qualitative nature and did not reach clear
conclusions in our reading.
4See e.g. Athey et al. (2013), and references therein.
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with minor exceptions, until very recently. New directives open some scope for past-performance
based selection.
The main reason US regulators and European public buyers push for the use of past-
performance indicators in selecting among contractors is that they consider them essential to
obtain good value for taxpayers’ money. Direct and indirect litigation costs are high and court-
enforced contracts are typically not sufficient to achieve satisfactory governance of all quali-
tative aspects of exchanges. Since procurement is rarely occasional, mechanisms that reward
past performance, which are widely used in private procurement, can complement and improve
substantially on what formal contracting can achieve (e.g. Kelman, 1990).5
Private buyers use past performance as a supplier selection criterion because they are con-
cerned about the price and quality of the intermediate goods and services they buy, a crucial
determinant of their competitiveness. Governments and regulators in charge of public pro-
curement may also be interested in objectives other than the price/quality ratio of publicly
purchased goods. For example, they are also usually concerned that the public procurement
process is transparent and open in order to stimulate cross-border procurement and market
integration—as in the case of the EU—as well as for obvious integrity/accountability reasons.6
They may want to ensure that small businesses are not excluded from public procurement, a
concern that in the US has led to large programs like the one started by the Small Business
Act.7 However, if the use of past-performance indicators in the selection of suppliers deters
entry, then there may be a trade-off between the improvement in price/quality ratios buyers
can secure using these past-performance indicators and the decrease in the likelihood that new,
possibly more efficient or innovative, suppliers will enter the market—as US senators feared for
the US federal procurement market.
To shed light on this controversial issue, we implement in the lab a simple repeated procure-
ment game with incentives implemented through a pre-announced and transparent bid subsidy
linked to past quality provision. We then study the effects of these incentives on the entry deci-
sion of a more efficient supplier. Theoretically, it is well known, at least since Klein and Leffler
(1981), that in markets where asymmetric information makes past performance important, new
entrants must produce below cost to build up an advantageous track record. With imperfect
5This is why Steven Kelman introduced them in the big reform of US federal procurement he led when serving
as Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget during the
Clinton administration, with the reform leading, among other things, to the Federal Procurement Streamlining
Act (1994).
6This may not always be the case in practice. Djankov et al. (2002), in a cross section comparison of 85
counties, show that stricter regulation of entry is associated with higher levels of corruption and greater size
of unofficial economic activity, suggesting entry is often regulated in the interest of regulators and not of the
consumers. See also Bandiera et al. (2009) as well as Coviello and Gagliarducci (2016).
7This includes rules limiting bundling, the establishment of the Small Business Agency and “set aside” pro-
grams trying to stimulate small business entry in many procurement markets. Athey et al. (2013) provide
empirical evidence that such “set-asides” typically foster entry by smaller firms at the cost of lower efficiency
and revenues. They go on to show that a policy similar to the one we study, i.e., subsidizing small bidders, may
foster entry without reducing efficiency or revenues. See also Marion (2007).
2
financial markets, this may lead to entry deterrence of smaller, more financially constrained
firms. However, quantitative studies on this possible effect are lacking, while policy makers
are increasingly wary of policy recommendations coming from complex theoretical models that
disregard crucial institutional aspects and are sensitive to changes in simplifying assumptions
needed to solve them. Some type of evidence is needed to convince policy makers. In this paper
we provide more structured evidence than the qualitative assessments in the GAO report men-
tioned above. An ideal dataset to study these questions would contain observations of behavior
in procurement markets that differ only in the role played by the supplier’s past performance.
For lack of such an exogenous variation in real-world procurement systems we conduct a tightly
controlled laboratory experiment based on the simplest procurement game we could envisage
that reflects the relevant environment and the issues at stake.8
We augment a three-period competitive procurement game among two suppliers with a
decision by each period’s winner on whether to provide costly quality in that period, and with
the possibility of entry by a third, more efficient competitor in the final period, which represents
the future. We then allow past performance to matter by adding a mechanism that generates
a pre-announced advantage at the bidding stage for a supplier that provided high quality in
the past. We implement this past performance advantage in the form of a transparent bid
subsidy, a mechanism which Athey et al. (2013) single out as being particularly promising in
real-world procurement auctions. Across treatments, we vary both the existence of an incentive
mechanism and, when a mechanism is present, the relative size of the bid subsidy that a potential
entrant—with no track record yet—may be given.
We use this framework, first and foremost, to ask whether past performance-based procure-
ment can or must necessarily deter entry, our main research question. We then dig deeper to
investigate precisely how the relative size of the entrant’s advantage (bid subsidy) affects both
the quality level delivered by sellers and the total costs paid by the buyer. This leads us to also
evaluate the effects of these mechanisms on welfare functions with different weights for quality,
price and entry, respectively.
One main novelty of our past performance mechanism is the provision of a bid subsidy to
the potential entrant. This aspect of our design is meant to address a common misconception.
It is often taken for granted in the policy debate that past performance mechanisms must
be designed so that entrant firms with no history of production would start on equal footing
with an incumbent firm having the worst possible track record—which would obviously provide
incumbent firms with an advantage that might deter new entrants. However, in order to be
8In this sense, our study belongs to the kind of experiments that Al Roth (1986) categorizes as “Whispering
in the ears of princes.” See e.g. Feldman and Ruffle (2015) and Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015) for recent laboratory
experiments that take a similar path to shed light on other important policy design questions. A field experiment
would of course be ideal as an external validity test, but it is not easy to change procurement rules for parts of
a country or region. Experiments with firms, on the other hand, can be arranged to clarify this question. See
Decarolis et al. (2016) for a step in this direction.
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effective in providing incentives, mechanisms must typically be based on clear rules that suppliers
know and trust, which give commitment power to the buyer and allow these systems to be
designed in a variety of ways. The mechanism may therefore award a positive rating to new
entrants—e.g., the maximum possible rating, or the average rating in the market, putting
entrants at less of a disadvantage—and ensure that this is taken into account by the scoring
rule that selects the contractor, even if the contractor has never interacted with the buyer before.
As a preview of our results, our data suggest that there need not be a trade-off between
past performance and entry in procurement. We do find that standard mechanisms—i.e., those
that assign zero score to potential entrants—increase quality but reduce entry. In this sense, the
concerns of the US senators are in principle justified. However, when the mechanism is designed
so that it awards a positive score also to potential entrants, we find that both entry and quality
may significantly increase relative to the baseline treatment without an incentive mechanism.
More surprisingly, we find that these increases in quality and entry raise the final price paid
by the buyer only moderately and sometimes not at all—even incorporating all applicable bid
subsidies. That is to say, well calibrated mechanisms of this type may elicit higher quality and
more frequent entry at no additional cost to the buyer, a kind of “nirvana” result.9
Providing a modicum of evidence on the external validity of this phenomenon, an analogous
result appears to be observed in a recent field study on the effects of the introduction of a
past performance system for the suppliers of a large corporation (Decarolis et al., 2016). One
potential explanation for this puzzling result is that the kind of multidimensional and intertem-
poral competition induced by a mechanism like this simply makes tacit collusion more difficult.
The past performance mechanism makes players asymmetric after the first round, and tacit
collusion being hindered by asymmetry is a recurrent finding in experimental oligopoly games
in general (Mason et al., 1992; Fonseca and Norman, 2008), and in homogeneous Bertrand
games in particular (Boone et al., 2012; Dugar and Mitra, 2016). In this sense, our results
could be seen as consistent with these previous experimental and empirical findings. In our
experiment, however, the asymmetry is endogenously generated by multidimensional intertem-
poral competition, not exogenously imposed. Also, Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000, 2002) find
that only by increasing the number of competitors to three or more or concealing losing bids in
past games is the Bertrand equilibrium eventually reached in one-shot interactions. Therefore,
prices consistently above the Bertrand solution in the first two rounds of our baseline treatment
were somewhat expected. The increase in competition we observe when a past performance
mechanism is introduced could then be due to the “increased complexity” of the competitive
9The “nirvana” result is puzzling because in a dynamic Bertrand-like environment, the prospects of a future
advantage after winning the first contract and obtaining a bid preference should induce tougher competition with
an incentive system in place, but only in the first stage (see e.g. Cabral and Villas Boas 2005). After that, the
incumbent should recoup the investment and overall (average) prices should in the end reflect the higher costs of
higher quality provision.
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environment, rather than to the asymmetry undermining tacit collusion. This is in line with the
theoretical hypothesis of Gale and Sabourian (2005) that more complexity induces faster con-
vergence to the competitive solution. Other more “behavioral” explanations for our “nirvana”
results could also be envisaged. Unfortunately, our experiment was not designed to discriminate
between these alternative explanations (we did not anticipate such a result), so clarifying the
robustness and the origin of this puzzling effect can be seen as an interesting line for future
work.
Our study is confined to a simple procurement game tested in a stylized laboratory setting.
However, if confirmed by further empirical and experimental evidence, our results imply that
the dual goals of providing incentives for quality provision and for increasing entry are not mu-
tually exclusive—they are both achievable through an appropriately designed past performance
mechanism. Moreover, since the reaction of prices to the presence of bid subsidies that we
observe is weak, it seems that the increase in quality and entry may come at very little cost to
buyers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our pro-
curement game, before discussing our experimental design. In Section 3, we present the results
from our experiment. Section 4 discusses how our results relate to the existing literature, while
in Section 5 we provide concluding remarks.
1.1 The procurement game
Our experiment will use variants of a dynamic procurement auction game featuring three se-
quential auctions. We chose to use three sequential auctions to make our experiment as simple
as possible while still allowing us to investigate the features we are primarily interested in.
Specifically, three is the minimum number allowing for investing in high quality (auction 1) and
potentially reaping the gains from such investment (auction 2) before a new, more efficient firm
has the option of entering the market (auction 3). In this section we describe the basic structure
of the game.
Our dynamic procurement auction game consists of three periods, each of which is composed
of two stages: an auction stage and a production stage. In each game, Periods 1 and 2 contain
two sellers who compete in the auction stage, with the winner choosing a quality level in the
production stage. Prior to Period 3, a third seller decides whether to enter the Period 3 auction,
which then proceeds as Periods 1 and 2, but with either 2 or 3 players depending on the third
seller’s entry decision. Each auction consists of homogeneous-good price competition involving
only the firms described.10
10Each static period is similar to the game studied in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). We adopt their as-
sumption that firms are fully informed because it simplifies the environment, allowing us and the subjects to
better focus on the per se complex dynamic choices of price, quality provision and entry under different past
performance regimes.
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Hereafter, we will refer to the two sellers that compete in all three auctions as “Incumbent
firms,” or simply Incumbents. The other seller, which competes in at most Auction 3, is referred
to as the “Entrant [firm].”
In the auction stage of each of these three periods, all participating firms submit bids
simultaneously. Bids are restricted to a discrete finite set, {0, 0.01, ..., b¯}. The firm submitting
the lowest bid wins the auction and must produce a good in the production stage of the period.
Ties in bids are broken by uniformly randomly selecting the winner from among the set of firms
submitting the lowest bid. Goods can be produced at one of two quality levels, high or low.
While the Entrant firm has a cost advantage relative to the Incumbents for producing a low
quality good, for all firms producing high quality is more costly than producing low quality.11
Any firm losing a particular auction earns 0 from that period. While Incumbents’ earnings
come solely from the auctions, the Entrant firm earns an outside wage of w for each auction it
does not participate in.12
Between each period, all three firms (including the Entrant) are informed of all bids submit-
ted as well as the quality level produced, high or low, by the winning firm in the immediately
previous period. Between Periods 2 and 3 – after the quality production stage of the second
period, but before the auction stage of Period 3 – the Entrant must decide whether or not to
participate in Auction 3. If it chooses to participate in Auction 3 it forgoes its outside wage of
w, but may earn profits from the auction. Consequently, an Entrant that chooses to stay out
of Auction 3 earns a total of 3w for the game, while an Entrant that chooses to enter into and
compete in Auction 3 earns 2w plus whatever additional profit it earns from Auction 3.
To incorporate past-performance incentives we use a bid subsidy with limited (one-stage)
memory. To be clear, the essential characteristic of a past performance benefit is that, holding
current auction bids constant, it puts a firm with good past performance at an advantage
relative to competitors with a poor past performance. Our bid subsidy implements this benefit
in a simple and transparent way and is analogous to the mechanism studied in Athey et al.
(2013). Specifically, for t ∈ {2, 3}, if the winning Incumbent firm in Period t − 1 delivered
the high quality good and also wins Auction t with bid b, this firm is paid a multiple of its
Auction t bid, Bb, by the procurer. Because our bid subsidy effectively reimburses the winning
firm a multiple of its bid, we refer to it from here on as a “reimbursement multiplier.”13 The
reimbursement multiplier allows a firm with good past performance to earn a positive profit
with a lower bid than an identical firm with poor past performance, conferring an advantage
11We limit the price advantage to low quality since an Entrant firm will never optimally choose to produce
high quality—the game ends after the Entrant firm makes its production decision.
12We assign the Entrant an outside wage in anticipation of our experiment. The outside wage provides partici-
pants assigned the role of the Entrant with experimental earnings comparable to those we may expect participants
assigned the Incumbent role to earn. Since it is a fixed wage it should have little impact on the strategic envi-
ronment.
13We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the “reimbursement multiplier” terminology.
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in terms of the ability of profitably winning the current Auction.14 To analyze the market
implications of assigning a positive score to a potential entrant, we also assign a reimbursement
multiplier β ≥ 1 to the Entrant firm.
In our experiment, detailed in the next section, we will vary the magnitude of the Entrant
firm’s multiplier across treatments. In addition to the reimbursement multipliers, other pa-
rameters of interest are the cost of producing a high or low quality good, cL and cH , and the
Entrant’s (additive) cost advantage at producing a low quality good, k. That is to say, the
Entrant firm’s cost of producing a low quality good is ceL = cL − k
To illustrate how the reimbursement multipliers work, consider the following sequence of
events. In Auction 1, Incumbent firm 1 submits the bid b1 = cL while Incumbent 2 submits
b2 = cL + 0.01. Incumbent 1 wins the auction and produces a high quality good, yielding total
Period 1 earnings of cL − cH . Incumbent 2’s Period 1 earnings are zero. In Auction 2, the
Incumbent firms submit bids of b1 = cL and b2 = cL + 0.01 again. Incumbent 1 wins again,
but produces low quality. Incumbent 1’s Period 2 earnings are BcL − cL = cL(B − 1), and its
total earnings from the first two periods are (cL − cH) + cL(B − 1) = BcL − cH . Incumbent 2’s
Period 2 profits are again zero, and its total earnings from the first two periods are also zero.
Between Periods 2 and 3, the Entrant firm decides to enter into and compete in Auction 3. The
Entrant submits the bid be = cL, while the Incumbent firms submit the bids b1 = cL + 0.01
and b2 = b¯. The Entrant firm wins Auction 3 and produces low quality. The Entrant’s profits
from Period 3 are βcL − ceL = cL(β − 1) + k, while both Incumbent firms earn zero profits from
Period 3. Overall, the Entrant’s profits from the game are 2w + cL(β − 1) + k. Incumbent 1
earns BcL − cH from the entire game, while Incumbent 2’s overall profits are zero.
In the Theoretical Appendix, we solve the game for general parameter values using the
solution concept Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) plus one additional restriction. In
particular, we impose the restriction that weakly dominated strategies not be played. In the
sections that follow, for concreteness we consider only the game variants we implemented in the
lab and solve our game only for those parameter values.
2 Experimental design
Participants play between twelve and fifteen rounds of the (three-period) dynamic procurement
auction game described in the previous section.15 Before each round, participants are randomly
and anonymously divided into groups of three and then randomly assigned one of two roles:
two participants in each three-person group are assigned the role of “Incumbent firm,” while
14Note that the bid advantage lasts only for one period, i.e. the length of the buyer’s memory of seller’s past
performance is just one auction.
15The number of rounds varies due to time constraints. Our participants had little, if any, prior experience
with experiments. Game play therefore proceeded relatively slowly. Each session featured as many rounds as we
could feasibly implement given a two-hour pre-scheduled time constraint.
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the third person in each group is assigned the role of “Entrant firm.”16 We implement multiple
rounds in order to allow participants the opportunity to learn how to play optimally. However,
they are instructed that at the end of the experiment only one round will be randomly chosen to
count towards their experimental earnings.17 At the end of each period, within each round, all
firms learn the bids of the other firms in their own group and the quality production decision of
the winning firm in their group. Firms learn nothing about bids or choices in groups other than
their own. Before the third period begins, Incumbent firms are informed of the entry decision
of the Entrant firm in their group.
We fix several parameters of the game to be constant across all rounds and all treatments:
cH = 2.00, cL = 1.50, k = 1.375, w = 1.00 and b¯ = 4.50.
18 Our choice of specific parameter
values balanced two concerns: expository simplicity to facilitate experimental participants’
understanding of the game against our desire for variation in equilibrium predictions across
treatments.
Across treatments, the only parameters we vary are the reimbursement multipliers, B and
β. Specifically, we conduct one “Baseline” treatment in which B = β = 1, which can be
thought of as implementing no past-performance incentive mechanism at all. In three other
treatments, we fix the Incumbents’ reimbursement multiplier at B = 2 and vary the Entrant
firm’s reimbursement multiplier.
2.1 Treatments
As mentioned above, the Entrant firm’s reimbursement multiplier, β ≥ 1, allows us to analyze
the market implications of assigning a positive score to a potential entrant. We vary the
magnitude of β across treatments, considering three main cases: i) treatment HM (“high
multiplier”), where the reimbursement multiplier for the Entrant firm is equal to the maximum
possible for an Incumbent firm, i.e. β = B; ii) treatment LM (“low multiplier”), where the
Entrant firm’s reimbursement multiplier is the minimum possible for the Incumbent, i.e. β = 1,
effectively no multiplier; and finally iii) treatment MM, or “medium multiplier,” in which the
Entrant firm’s reimbursement multiplier is between the maximum and the minimum possible
for Incumbent firms, i.e., β = (B+1)2 .
Treatment HM is analogous to supplier qualification and quality assurance systems common
in the private sector where all qualified suppliers start with a fixed maximum number of points,
16We use the terms “Incumbent” and “Entrant” here for clarity of exposition. Neutral language was used in
the experiment. Specifically, roles were referred to as “Firm A,” “Firm B” and “Firm C,” with the first two
being Incumbents and the latter the Entrant.
17This is a standard practice in experimental economics and serves to provide proper incentives in each round
by, for example, ameliorating across-round hedging motives.
18We capped allowable bids at 4.50 euros as a precaution against the unlikely possibility of firms colluding on
very high bids. This maximum was set to be substantially higher than would be expected in any equilibrium of
the game. The precaution turned out to be unnecessary, as even though setting an explicit upper bound on bids
in all likelihood enhanced the opportunity for collusion by creating a focal point, successful collusion on bids of
4.50 euros was essentially non-existent in the data.
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lose points for bad performance, and may regain them through good performance but only up to
the initial, maximum level. Points-based driver’s license incentive systems are also designed this
way in many countries. The LM treatment corresponds to a more standard past performance
system where new firms without track records start out with minimal score. The remaining
treatment, MM, represents a compromise between these two extremes, i.e. β = (B+1)2 , and
corresponds to the case where Entrant firms enjoy the average market past performance score
in a market where one of the two Incumbent firms has a good past performance. These rules
are common knowledge among all players.
2.2 Equilibrium predictions
In this section, we describe equilibria in our game for the parameter values we use in our ex-
periment. In a Theoretical Appendix we discuss equilibria in the game more broadly. For
equilibrium predictions both here and in the Theoretical Appendix we use the solution concept
of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) with the additional restriction that weakly domi-
nated strategies not be played.19 We discuss this restriction in the Theoretical Appendix. Here
we merely state that we view the restriction as reasonable in that it rules out some types of
non-credible threats that SPNE would rule out in a purely sequential-moves setting. It rules
out, e.g., an Incumbent without a reimbursement multiplier bidding below cL in the Period 3
auction.
To analyze the game, we first fix notation. Denote Player i’s bid in Auction t by bti, where t ∈
{I, II, III}, i ∈ {1, 2, e}. Subscripts i = 1, 2 refer to Incumbent 1 and Incumbent 2, respectively,
while the subscript i = e refers to the Entrant. Label the quality production decision in Period
t by Qti ∈ {H,L}, i ∈ {1, 2, e}, t ∈ {I, II, III}, where H and L mean H(igh) and L(ow) quality,
respectively. We include the Entrant to simplify notation, but note that it can only submit a
bid or make a quality production decision in (at most) Period 3. Denote by E ∈ {in, out} the
Entrant’s decision between Periods 2 and 3 about whether to enter into and compete in Auction
3 (E = in) or to stay out of Auction 3 (E = out). While all of these actions can be conditioned
on all prior information sets, for simplicity we suppress this dependence in our notation.
For ease of exposition, we will typically assume that the winning Incumbent, as well as the
Incumbent submitting the (weakly) lowest bid, is Incumbent 1. For expositional simplicity,
we will also sometimes refer to the addition to profits resulting only from actions taking place
within a subgame as profits in that subgame.
We analyze our Baseline treatment first, followed by the HM, LM and MM treatments. We
begin by remarking that in all treatments, since Period 3 production concludes the game, there
19To provide some empirical evidence about whether this additional restriction is reasonable in our experiment,
we focus on Auction 3 where its implications are the clearest and compute the proportion of observations in our
data satisfying the restriction. We find that it is satisfied in about 92% of our Auction 3 observations. The
proportion is similar across treatments and across rounds, being typically above 90%.
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is never any monetary incentive to produce high quality in Period 3 but there is a monetary
cost. This implies that low quality is produced by the firm winning Period 3 in all equilibria:
QIIIi = L, i ∈ {1, 2, e}.
2.2.1 Baseline
We start with Period 3 and work backwards. Because there is no reimbursement multiplier
for any firm, Incumbents never bid below cL (by assumption) in Auction 3 in any equilibrium:
bIIIi ≥ 1.50, i = 1, 2. As a consequence, Entrants choosing E = in can always win Auction 3 in
subgame equilibrium by, for instance, submitting a bid of bIIIe = 1.49 against Incumbent bids
of bIII1 = 1.50, b
III
2 ≥ 1.50. Another type of subgame equilibrium features bIIIe = 1.50 against
Incumbent bids of bIII1 = 1.51, b
III
2 ≥ 1.51. In these latter equilibria, the Entrant obtains a profit
of 1.50− ceL = 1.50−0.125 = 1.375, while in the former type the Entrant’s profit is 1.374. Since
the Entrant’s profit from staying out is w = 1 < 1.374 < 1.375, the Entrant always chooses to
compete in Auction 3 and wins with bIIIe ∈ {1.49, 1.50}. Consequently, Incumbents always earn
zero profit from Period 3 in equilibrium.
Working back one step, since Incumbents always earn zero profit on the equilibrium path
from Period 3, there is no benefit to producing high quality in Period 2. The winning Incum-
bent, Incumbent 1 by convention, therefore produces low quality in Period 2 in any subgame
equilibrium: QII1 = L.
Working backwards, in the auction stage of Period 2, there are two types of subgame equi-
libria to consider. In one type, both Incumbents’ bids are exactly equal to (low quality) cost:
bII1 = 1.50 = b
II
2 , yielding zero equilibrium profits for both Incumbents from Period 2. In the
other type of equilibrium, bII1 = 1.51 = b
II
2 . Because ties are broken with a coin flip, in this type
of equilibrium both Incumbents earn an expected profit of 0.005. Consequently, Incumbents’
additional profits from subgames starting at Auction 2 are always either 0 or 0.05 in equilibrium.
Working backwards once more, since there is no subsequent benefit to producing high quality
to offset its additional cost, low quality is always produced in any equilibrium in Period 1
(QI1 = L). Bids in Auction 1 follow the same general pattern as bids in Auction 2 in equilibrium:
bids are identical to one another and are both either low-quality cost (bI1 = cL = 1.50 = b
I
2) or
one cent above (bI1 = cL + 0.01 = 1.51 = b
I
2). Consequently, profits from Period 1 by itself are
always approximately zero (0 or 0.005) in equilibrium.
Summing up, in the Baseline treatment equilibrium predictions are that: i) low quality
is always produced (Qti = L, i = 1, 2, e, t = I, II, III); ii) entry always occurs (E = in); iii)
winning bids are approximately equal to low-quality cost and, in particular, are always in the
set {1.49, 1.50, 1.51}; and iv) Incumbents’ bids in Auctions 1 and 2 are always equal and always
either 1.50 or both 1.51.
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2.2.2 HM treatment: B = 2, β = 2
In treatments with a formal incentive mechanism, equilibrium predictions are more complicated.
We start with the HM treatment. In Auction 3, if Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier,
the lowest bid it can submit in any subgame equilibrium is cLB = 0.75. Bidding below this would
guarantee itself a negative Auction 3 profit. Similarly, if neither Incumbent has a reimbursement
multiplier the lowest an Incumbent’s bid can be in equilibrium is cL = 1.50.
In the first case, where an Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant can win
Auction 3 with a bid of bIIIe = 0.74 against Incumbent bids of b
III
1 = 0.75 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50.20
The Entrant’s profit in this type of equilibrium would be 2× 0.74− ceL = 1.355. In the second
scenario, where neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, one type of equilibrium
entails the Entrant submitting bIIIe = 1.49 against Incumbent bids of b
III
1 = 1.50 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50,
yielding Entrant profits of 2× 1.49− ceL = 2.855.21
Considering the entry decision, it is the case that in all subgame equilibria an Entrant who
chooses E = in earns Period 3 profit larger than w = 1, the profit it would earn from choosing
E = out. Consequently, Entry always occurs in equilibrium (E = in).
Stepping backwards and considering the production stage of Period 2, note that because
along the equilibrium path E = in always occurs, the increment to an Incumbent’s revenue
from producing high quality would be zero – it loses Auction 3 with or without a reimbursement
multiplier – while the increment to its cost would be strictly positive. Therefore, in any subgame
equilibrium the winning Incumbent produces low quality in Period 2 (QII1 = L).
Moving backward to the auction stage of Period 2, if neither incumbent enters this stage
with a reimbursement multiplier then in equilibrium Auction 2 bids follow the same pattern as
in the Baseline treatment considered above: bII1 = 1.50 = b
II
2 or b
II
1 = 1.51 = b
II
2 , yielding Period
2 profits from this type of subgame of either 0 or 0.005. If, on the other hand, Incumbent 1
enters Period 2 with a reimbursement multiplier it wins Auction 2 in (subgame) equilibrium
with either a bid of bII1 = 1.49 against b
II
2 = 1.50 or a bid of b
II
1 = 1.50 against b
II
2 = 1.51.
22
Consequently, Period 2 profits for Incumbent 1 from this type of subgame equilibrium are either
2× 1.49− cL = 2.98− 1.50 = 1.48 or 2× 1.50− cL = 3.00− 1.50 = 1.50.
Working backwards to the production stage of Period 1, notice that the increment to profits
from producing high quality in Period 1 are at least 1.48 − 0.005 = 1.475, which is greater
than the associated 0.50 increase in costs. As a result, high quality is always produced by the
20Incumbent 2 cannot also have a reimbursement multiplier and therefore by assumption cannot bid less than
cL.
21Other equilibria when Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier involve the Entrant bidding bIIIe = 0.75
against bIII1 = 0.76 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50 resulting in Entrant profits of 1.375 or, when neither Incumbent has a
reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant bidding bIIIe = 1.50 against b
III
1 = 1.51 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.51 and earning profits
of 2.875.
22The other Incumbent firm cannot bid strictly below 1.50 by our restriction on equilibrium strategies since
this would result in an addition to profit from the subgame of at most 1.49− 1.50 + 0.005 = −0.01 + 0.005 < 0.
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winning firm in equilibrium in Period 1 (QI1 = H).
At the initial information set, i.e., the auction stage of Period 1, total subsequent equilibrium
profits from winning and producing high quality are either bI1 − cH + 1.48 = bI1 − 0.52 or
bI1 − cH + 1.50 = bI1 − 0.50. Since Incumbents are symmetric in Auction 1, (approximately)
all future profits are bid away in equilibrium. As a consequence, there are multiple essentially
equivalent types of equilibria. In one type of equilibrium, both Incumbents submit a bid exactly
driving away subsequent profits. For example, if the subsequent profits from Auction 2 forward
along the equilibrium path are 1.50, then bids in this type of equilibrium satisfy bIi−cH = −1.50,
i.e., bI1 = 0.50 = b
I
2. The other type of equilibrium involves both Incumbents submitting bids
which would leave one cent of continuation game profits, yielding an expected profit from the
game of 0.005. In the previous example, this would require bI1 = 0.51 = b
I
2.
In summary, our predicted behavior in the HM treatment is as follows: i) extremely low
bids (bIi < cL, i = 1, 2) coupled with high quality production (Q
I
1 = H) in Period 1; ii) bids
at cost (bIIi ≈ cL, i = 1, 2) together with low quality production (QII1 = H) in Period 2; iii)
entry between Periods 2 and 3 (E = in) followed by bids of approximately (low-quality) cost
(bIIIe ≈ cL,min{bIII1 , bIII2 } ≈ cL) in Auction 3. That is to say, all the equilibria in the HM
treatment share a feature which we call “Entrant Accommodation:” the Incumbent firm
that wins the auction in Period 1 produces high quality in that period, exploits this advantage
to win Auction 2 as well, but then cashes in on this advantage and accommodates the Entrant
by producing low quality in Period 2. Accommodation here refers to the fact that by entering
Auction 3 without a reimbursement multiplier the Incumbent permits the Entrant to earn a
much higher profit than it could otherwise.
2.2.3 LM treatment: B = 2, β = 1
In the LM treatment the Entrant is on equal footing with an Incumbent without a reimburse-
ment multiplier. At the auction stage of Period 3, there are four types of subgames to consider:
Incumbent 1 has or does not have a reimbursement multiplier and entry did or did not occur
between Periods 2 and 3.
First consider subgames following E = in. If Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier
and the Entrant chose to enter Auction 3, then on the equilibrium path the Entrant wins the
auction with a bid of bIIIe = 0.74 against bids of b
III
1 = 0.75 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50. The Entrant’s
Period 3 profit in this type of subgame is 0.74 − ceL = 0.615.23 In the type of subgame where
neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier and entry occurs (E = in), the Entrant wins
Auction 3 with a bid of bIIIe = 1.50 against bids of b
III
1 = 1.51 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.51 and earns a Period
3 profit of 1.50− ceL = 1.375.24
23Another type of subgame equilibrium involves bIIIe = 0.75 against bids of b
III
1 = 0.76 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50, yielding
the Entrant a Period 3 profit of 0.625.
24Alternatively, in this type of subgame, bIIIe = 1.49 against bids of b
III
1 = 1.50 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50 also constitute
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In the type of subgame following E = out the Entrant always earns its outside wage w = 1
from Period 3, while the Incumbents’ profits depend on whether Incumbent 1 has a reim-
bursement multiplier or not. If Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier, it wins Auction
3 with a bid of bIII1 = 1.50 against b
III
2 = 1.51 yielding Incumbent 1 a Period 3 profit of
2× 1.50− 1.50 = 1.50.25 If neither Incumbent has a multiplier, then since the Incumbents are
symmetric the two possible subgame equilibria both entail approximately zero Period 3 profit
for both Incumbents: the bids bIII1 = 1.50 and b
III
2 = 1.50 constitute an equilibrium yielding zero
profit; the bids bIII1 = 1.51 and b
III
2 = 1.51 also constitute an equilibrium and yield (expected)
profits of 0.005 for each Incumbent.
Working backwards to the entry decision, the Entrant chooses E = in whenever neither
Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier since its minimum profit from Period 3 along the
equilibrium path in this type of subgame is 1.365 > 1 = w. On the other hand, whenever
Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier the maximum Period 3 profit the Entrant could
earn from entry in this type of subgame equilibrium would be 0.625 < 1 = w, so that the
Entrant chooses to stay out of Auction 3. In summary, the Entrant always chooses E = out if
Incumbent 1 produces high quality in Period 2 and always chooses E = in otherwise.
Stepping back to the production stage of Period 2, the winning Incumbent can deter entry
on the equilibrium path by producing high quality. An Incumbent entering the auction stage of
Period 3 with a reimbursement multiplier earns Period 3 profits of at least 1.48 in equilibrium,
while producing low quality always results in (approximately) zero Period 3 profits. Because
the increment to an Incumbent’s profit from producing high quality is greater than the 0.50
cost increase, the Incumbent who wins Auction 2 always produces high quality (QII1 = H) in
subgame equilibrium.
In the auction stage of Period 2, there are again two types of subgames: either i) Incumbent
1 has a reimbursement multiplier; or ii) neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier.
In either case, our restriction on equilibrium bids implies that the bid of a firm without a
reimbursement multiplier satisfies bIIi − cH ≥ −Period 3 profit. Assume firms are in the type of
subgame where Period 3 profits for the Incumbent winning Auction 2 will be 1.50 in equilibrium.
In case i), Incumbent 1 wins the auction with a bid of bII1 = 0.50 against a bid of b
II
2 = 0.51
yielding subgame equilibrium profits of 0.50 = 2× 0.50− cH + 1.50.26 In case ii) where neither
Incumbent firm has a reimbursement multiplier, symmetric Bertrand competition for Period
3 profits of 1.50 yields equilibrium bids which ensure (approximately) zero profits from the
subgame in equilibrium. For example, if bII1 = b
II
2 = 0.50, then the winning Incumbent earns
mutual best replies, yielding the Entrant a Period 3 profit of 1.365.
25Another equilibrium in a subgame of this type features bIII1 = 1.49 against b
III
2 = 1.50, yielding Incumbent 1
a profit of 2× 1.49− 1.50 = 1.48.
26Alternatively, Incumbent 1 wins the Auction in equilibrium with bII1 = 0.49 against b
II
2 = 0.50, yielding
Incumbent 1 subgame equilibrium profits of 2× 0.49− cH + 1.50 = 0.48
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profits of 0.50−cH +1.50 = −1.50+1.50 = 0 in the subgame along the equilibrium path. These
bids constitute one type of subgame equilibrium. The other equilibrium, as should be familiar
by now, involves bids one cent higher (bII1 = b
II
2 = 0.51) and subgame profits of 0.005 for both
Incumbents.
At the production stage of Period 1, subgame profits of 0.50 are possible following QI1 = H,
while approximately zero additional profit is associated with choosing QI1 = L. Assume the
equilibrium being played is one in which 0.50 is the increase in subsequent subgame equilibrium
profit from QI1 = H, while Q
I
1 = L entails no increase in subsequent subgame profit. Since the
0.50 increase in subgame profit from producing high quality exactly offsets the 0.50 increase
in costs, the winning Incumbent is indifferent between its two actions in this stage. Therefore,
either QI1 = H or Q
I
1 = L are possible in equilibrium.
At the game’s initial information set, the auction stage of Period 1 features symmetric
Bertrand competition for some fixed amount of subsequent equilibrium profit, which depends
on the equilibrium being played. Bids in Auction 1 drive away these future profits. As an
example, suppose QI1 = H on the equilibrium path and the equilibrium being played is of the
type described in the preceding paragraph. Then in equilibrium, bids must offset the cost of
producing high quality in Period 1. Consequently, the bids bI1 = b
I
2 = 2.00 are possible in
equilibrium, as are the bids bI1 = b
I
2 = 2.01.
27
Summarizing, in the LM treatment there are, broadly speaking, two types of equilibria. In
the first type, Period 1 bids are high (bIi ≈ cH , i = 1, 2) and high quality is produced (QI1 = H);
Period 2 bids are low (bIIi < cL, i = 1, 2) and high quality is produced (Q
II
1 = H); between Periods
2 and 3 entry never occurs (E = out); in Period 3, bids are moderate (bIIIi ≈ cL, i = 1, 2).
In the second type of equilibrium, Period 1 bids are moderate (bIi ≈ cL, i = 1, 2) and low
quality is produced (QI1 = L); Period 2 bids are low (b
II
i < cL, i = 1, 2) and high quality is
produced (QII1 = H); between Periods 2 and 3, entry never occurs (E = out); in Period 3, bids
are moderate (bIIIi ≈ cL, i = 1, 2).
Notice that in either of these two broad types of equilibrium, high quality is produced in
Period 2, which deters entry. Because of this, we refer to both of these broad types of equilibria
as examples of “Entry Deterrence” equilibria.
2.2.4 MM treatment, B = 2, β = 2+12 = 1.5
Finally, consider the MM treatment. In the auction stage of Period 3, our restriction on equilib-
rium bids implies that the lowest an Incumbent firm can bid is 0.75, if it has a reimbursement
multiplier, or 1.50 if it does not. There are four types of subgames leading into Auction 3 to con-
sider: either Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier or neither firm has a reimbursement
27Similarly, in equilibria featuring QI1 = L the bids b
I
1 = b
I
2 = 1.50 and b
I
1 = b
I
2 = 1.51 constitute mutual best
responses and hence can be played in equilibrium.
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multiplier and, for each of these cases, entry did or did not occur.
Consider first the type of subgame equilibrium, following E = in. If neither Incumbent has
a reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant firm wins the auction with a bid of either bIIIe = 1.50 or
bIIIe = 1.49.
28 The Entrant’s profits from Period 3 are therefore bIIIe ×1.5−cEL = bIIIe ×1.5−0.125,
i.e., either 2.125 or 2.11. If Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant also
wins the auction in subgame equilibrium with a bid of either bIIIe = 0.75 or b
III
e = 0.74.
29
The Entrant’s Period 3 profits in this type of subgame equilibrium are consequently either
0.75× 1.5− cEL = 1.125− 0.125 = 1 or 0.74× 1.5− cEL = 0.985 < 1. The Incumbents’ Period 3
profits following E = in are always zero in this type of subgame equilibrium.
In the type of subgame following E = out, the Entrant’s Period 3 profits are always w = 1,
while the description of the subgame equilibria for the Incumbents is identical to the description
provided for the other treatments, above. If Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier it wins
the auction with a bid of bIII1 ∈ {1.50, 1.49} yielding Incumbent 1 a Period 3 profit of either
1.50 or 1.48 from the subgame. If neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, the two
subgame equilibria (bIII1 = b
III
2 = 1.50 or b
III
1 = b
III
2 = 1.51) both entail approximately zero
Period 3 profit for each Incumbent.
Moving backwards, the Entrant’s decision between Periods 2 and 3 is as follows: if neither
Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant always chooses E = in since 2.11 > 1;
if Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier, then either E = in or E = out are possible
in equilibrium. Either the Entrant is indifferent – when its Period 3 equilibrium profits are
exactly equal to 1 – or the Entrant strictly prefers E = out. The latter is true when its Period
3 equilibrium profits will be 0.985.
Working backward, when choosing which quality level to produce in Period 2 the winning
Incumbent’s subsequent total profits depend on the equilibrium being played. Any equilibrium
where the Entrant firm chooses E = in leaves zero profit for an Incumbent irrespective of its
reimbursement multiplier. For these subgames, we can immediately see what types of strategies
must be played in any equilibrium for all previous periods: they coincide with the “Entrant
Accommodation” equilibria characterized in our discussion of the HM treatment above. In
contrast, in any subgame equilibrium featuring E = out between Periods 2 and 3 the winning
Incumbent produces high quality in Period 2 (QII1 = H). In this case, strategies in all previous
periods in any equilibrium resemble the strategies played in the “Entry Deterrence” equilibria
described in connection with the LM treatment above.
Summing up, in the MM treatment we can expect to observe two broad types of equilibria.
On the one hand, any of the Entry Deterrence equilibria we described in connection with the LM
28Incumbent bids supporting the former Entrant bid are bIII1 = 1.51 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.51, while the bids bIII1 = 1.50
and bIII2 ≥ 1.50 support the latter.
29Incumbent bids supporting bIIIe = 0.75 are b
III
1 = 0.76 and b
III
2 ≥ 1.50, while the bids bIII1 = 0.75 and bIII2 ≥ 1.50
support bIIIe = 0.74.
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treatment may occur. On the other hand, all of the Entrant Accommodation equilibria appearing
in our discussion of the HM treatment above are also possible. As a result, we predict a mix
of the features of these two broad types of equilibria in our data. Overall, Period 1 and 2 bids
should be moderate and high quality should sometimes be produced in these periods. Entry
should sometimes occur.
2.3 Implementation
All sessions of the experiment were conducted in the laboratory facilities at the Einaudi Insti-
tute for Economics and Finance in Rome, Italy, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Twelve sessions were conducted involving a total of 243 participants. Average earnings in the
experiment were approximately 12 euros, including a show-up fee and payment for a risk elic-
itation task conducted after all rounds of the game were completed but before participants
knew which round would be chosen to determine their earnings.30 Because participants did not
know about the risk elicitation task when playing the auction game, it should not have affected
decisions there. Each session lasted about two hours. Information on all four treatments is
summarized in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here.
3 Results
Our experimental outcomes of interest are the proportion of winning firms producing high
quality, the cost to the buyer—which we call the “buyer’s (total) transfer” to avoid confusion
with the sellers’ costs of producing—as well as the proportion of Entrant firms choosing to enter.
We first consider each of these outcomes in isolation and then consider buyers’ welfare, which
may incorporate some or all of these outcomes simultaneously.
3.1 Quality provision
Let us first examine quality provision, since encouraging high-quality goods provision is a pri-
mary reason buyers might prefer to implement some form of incentive mechanism. In Table
30We included the risk elicitation task in order to ensure participants of a reasonable amount of money, as our
equilibrium predictions suggested they would make little money from the auctions—a common dilemma when
implementing Bertrand competition games in the lab. This concern turned out to be warranted, as competi-
tion indeed drove profits from the auctions alone down to around e1.30, on average. While it may seem low,
participants’ average earnings of e12 for two hours of their time is commensurate with their opportunity costs.
For example, work-study positions pay e5.50 per hour at a private college near the EIEF in Rome, whose pay
structure we are familiar with. The risk elicitation task involved a sequence of choices between a sure payment
of e5 and a lottery involving a 50% chance of a low payoff (e2.50) and a 50% chance of a high payoff, which
increased over the sequence from e7.50 to e17 in steps of e0.50. More risk averse individuals should switch from
preferring the sure payment to the lottery later in the sequence, so we take this switch point as an index of each
participant’s risk aversion. If there were multiple switch points, we follow much of the literature using related
mechanisms and only consider the first switch point. One choice in the sequence was randomly chosen to count,
with uncertainty being resolved, if necessary, by flipping a coin.
16
2, we report the average proportion of winning firms providing high quality. As expected, we
observe a remarkable increase in high-quality provision in the first two periods in all treatments
which involve an incentive mechanism relative to the baseline treatment, which lacks such a
mechanism. For example, in Period 1 about 80% of winning firms provide high quality when-
ever there is an incentive mechanism, whereas in the baseline treatment only 18% of winning
firms provide high quality—a 340% increase in the likelihood of high quality provision.31 Av-
eraging across all three periods (Table 2, last column), high quality provision is consistently
about four times more likely with an incentive mechanism than without one.32
Insert Table 2 about here.
Result 1: The introduction of an incentive mechanism significantly increases supplied qual-
ity.
More formally, in Table 3 we estimate probit models of the binary decision to provide high
quality in each of the periods separately (columns 1-3). In column 4, we pool observations from
all three periods and estimate a Tobit model, using as the dependent variable the proportion of
the three periods in which the winning firm provided high quality. In each of these estimates we
cluster standard errors by session and, to control for dynamic effects such as learning, we include
the round of the observation as a control.33 In these and all subsequent model estimates, unless
otherwise noted, we cluster standard errors by session to allow for arbitrary within-session
correlation of behavior. Confirming appearances in the raw data, we find that high-quality
provision is significantly higher in all of our incentive mechanism treatments relative to the
baseline treatment (the excluded category).
Finally, notice that in all treatments except the baseline, quality provision declines precipi-
tously from the second period to the third. This suggests that participants generally understood
the strategic incentives inherent in each three-period sequence, as there is no incentive to produce
high quality in Period 3. At the same time, even in Period 3 quality provision is significantly
lower in the baseline treatment than in any other treatment. One plausible explanation that
would provide a further unintended benefit of implementing an incentive mechanism is that
participants acquired a “habit” of high-quality provision in the first two periods which carried
31It is somewhat surprising that even in the Baseline treatment with no incentives, 18% of winning firms choose
to provide costly high quality. A likely explanation is a framing or labeling effect of high quality producing “ good
reputation” even when there are no concomitant financial incentives. This could be an interesting point worthy
of further investigation in future research. However, for now we only note that this framing effect is constant
across our treatments so that it should not contaminate across-treatment comparisons.
32In the Appendix (Table A1), we report a battery of pairwise non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests confirming
the statistical significance of many of the large differences observed in the raw numbers: in Periods 1 and 2,
Mann-Whitney tests reveal that quality provision in the baseline treatment is significantly different from all
other treatments; differences among the non-baseline treatments themselves are generally not significant.
33In the Appendix (Table B1), we allow for more flexible dynamic effects by introducing a full set of round
dummies into our model estimates. Nothing changes either qualitatively or in terms of statistical significance.
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over to the third period. Other possible explanations include “framing” or symbolic effects
generated by the incentive mechanism. In any event, the effect is relatively small in magnitude,
so we do not focus on it here.
Insert Table 3 about here.
3.2 Entry
Having confirmed that introducing an incentive mechanism can substantially increase costly
quality provision, we are now in a position to address the central question of our inquiry: is
there necessarily a trade-off between past performance and entry?
In Table 4, we report the proportion of Entrant firms choosing to enter the Period 3 auction.
These raw data suggest that an incentive mechanism which assigns no reimbursement multiplier
to the Entrant firm (LM) may indeed hinder entry, as feared by US senators and EU regulators.
At the same time, however, our data suggest that a properly calibrated incentive mechanism
need not hinder entry. Indeed, in both treatments where the Entrant firm is not assigned the
worst possible score—MM and HM—our incentive mechanism tends to increase entry, without
reducing quality provision.34
Insert Table 4 about here.
To get a more formal sense of the significance of the effect of our incentive mechanism
on entry, in Table 5 we report marginal effects estimates from a probit model using, as the
dependent variable, an indicator taking the value one if the Entrant firm decided to enter the
Period 3 auction. On the right-hand side, we include a set of treatment dummy variables with
the baseline treatment as the excluded category. We cluster standard errors by session and, to
account for dynamic patterns in a simple way, we control for the round of the observation.35 We
find that entry is significantly higher relative to the baseline treatment, both economically and
statistically, whenever the Entrant firm is not assigned the worst possible score. In treatments
MM and HM, the estimated marginal effect of an incentive mechanism is to increase entry by 8
to 10 percentage points. On the other hand, we also find that the decline in entry observed in
the raw data when Entrant firms are assigned a poor score (LM) is not statistically significant.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Result 2a: The introduction of an incentive mechanism that assigns a poor score to an
entrant reduces the frequency of entry, although the effect is not statistically significant.
34As before, a battery of pairwise non-parametric tests by treatment is reported in the Appendix (Table A2),
supporting the notion that the introduction of an incentive mechanism can either significantly increase or decrease
entry, depending on the relative score assigned to the Entrant firm.
35A more flexible specification for dynamic patterns, incorporating a full set of round dummy variables, can be
found in the Appendix, Table B2. This more flexible specification does not yield substantially different estimates.
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Result 2b: The introduction of an appropriately designed incentive mechanism that as-
signs a positive score to an entrant significantly increases the frequency of entry relative to the
benchmark treatment without incentives, and does not reduce quality provision.
Result 2a shows that the concerns raised in the policy debate about the possibility that
rewarding past performance may hinder entry of new suppliers are justified and are captured
by our experimental set up. Result 2b is our first main result. It shows that the answer to
our main research question is negative: there is not necessarily a trade-off between past per-
formance/quality and entry. A well designed and calibrated incentive mechanism that rewards
past performance with a higher chance of winning (e.g. with a bid preference) can achieve both
higher quality and higher entry.
3.3 Buyer’s transfer
Because our results suggest that the effect of past performance on entry depends on the relative
level of the Entrant firm’s reimbursement multiplier, and quality provision is costly for the
supplier, a natural question to ask at this point is whether the most desirable outcome of
high quality coupled with high entry comes at a significant increase in costs to the buyer. To
avoid confusion with firms’ costs of production, in the discussion that follows we refer to the
total amount the buyer pays to the winning seller, accounting for any relevant reimbursement
multiplier, as the “buyer’s transfer.”
In Table 6 we report average buyers’ transfers by treatment and period, as well as the
average buyer’s transfer across all three periods. Somewhat surprisingly (at least for us) our
data suggest there is only a very mild effect of even large bid subsidies on buyers’ transfers, even
though supplied quality increases. Buyers’ transfers are generally lower in the first period when
there is a an incentive mechanism than when there is not, reflecting competition for the bid
advantage that high quality production entails in the subsequent period. In subsequent periods,
buyers’ transfers are generally higher when there is an incentive mechanism. Considering the
average buyer’s transfer across all three periods, there is typically only a mild increase in buyers’
transfers associated with our incentive mechanism. The mildest increase is associated with the
MM treatment (4.2%) while the largest increase, associated with the most generous Entrant
reimbursement multiplier (HM), is still only 12.6%.
Insert Table 6 about here.
Moving from raw averages to more formal econometric models, in Table 7 we present OLS
estimates of buyers’ transfers across treatments and periods. As usual, we cluster standard errors
by session and control for dynamic effects in a simple manner, reporting estimates allowing for
more flexible dynamic patterns in the Appendix (Table B3). In both specifications, we find that
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introducing an incentive mechanism significantly lowers buyers’ transfers in Period 1, while it
significantly increases buyers’ transfers in subsequent periods. Considering buyers’ transfers
averaged over all three periods (Column 4), the increase in buyers’ transfers associated with
introducing an incentive mechanism ranges from small in magnitude and non-significant (MM;
4.8%) to moderate in magnitude and highly significant (HM; 12.1%), matching well the values
gleaned from our inspection of raw averages.
Overall, the patterns suggest that in a properly calibrated past-performance incentive mech-
anism profit opportunities may be essentially fully competed away so that the associated increase
in costly quality provision and entry comes at little or no cost to the buyer. At the same time,
the data suggest that the negative consequences of a poorly calibrated mechanism accrue pri-
marily through increased buyers’ transfers and through entry. While there is little variation
in quality provision across our three non-baseline treatments, our past-performance incentive
mechanism increases entry in both our HM and MM treatments, but it does not increase, and
may even decrease, entry in our LM treatment relative to our baseline treatment.
Insert Table 7 about here.
Result 3: The introduction of an incentive mechanism that increases both quality and entry
may not substantially increase the transfer paid by the buyer.
This is our second main result, and perhaps the most surprising one. The increase in
costly quality provision and in the frequency of entry generated by the incentive mechanism
may not entail additional costs to the buyer. An increase in supplier competition, linked to
either the (endogenous) asymmetry or to the increased complexity introduced by the incentives
mechanism, appears to us a likely explanation.36
3.4 Buyer’s preferences: theoretical and empirical welfare functions
As a final exercise before concluding, in this section we construct a welfare function for buyers
and examine how buyer’s welfare varies, both theoretically and empirically, over our treat-
ments.37 In particular, we suppose that the buyer derives utility from three additively separa-
ble components: buyer’s transfer (negatively), quality and entry. We model this in a flexible
manner by assuming buyer’s welfare is a simple weighted average of these three components.
We then compare the welfare generated by each of our treatments—both theoretically, using
equilibrium predictions, and empirically, using the experimental data—in two cases: i) buyers
36As will be discussed in the literature review, several previous experiments showed that asymmetry may have
pro-competitive effects in oligopolistic environments. The argument that increased complexity may foster compe-
tition is theoretical instead, and goes back to Gale and Sabourian (2005). A recent empirical study by Decarolis
et al. (2016) appears to find an analogous “nirvana” result for the buyer—introducing an incentive mechanism
for suppliers increases supplied quality but not the price paid by the buyer—providing some reassurance about
the external validity of Result 3.
37We are grateful to Gary Charness for suggesting this last exercise.
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place equal weight on entry, quality and buyer’s transfer; and ii) buyers do not care directly
about entry, but rather divide all weight equally between the remaining two components. One
can think of the first case as representing the situation in the EU, where increasing cross-border
entry per se is a main political objective; the latter case may be closer to the US, where entry
is valued only insofar as it increases efficiency and value-for-money for the taxpayer.
The welfare function we consider is W = αD + δQ + γPr(E), where α + δ + γ ≤ 1;
D =
4.5−
∑3
t=1 Tt
3
4.5 ; and Tt is the transfer from buyer to seller (i.e., [winning bid]*[relevant reim-
bursement multiplier]) in Period t. Notice that since 4.5 is the maximum allowable bid in the
experiment, D is a measure of the “discount” below the maximum possible price buyers could
pay excluding bid subsidies. This serves as a convenient normalization of the buyer’s transfer
component of welfare on a 0 − 1 scale. The other two components of the welfare function are
straightforward: Q is the proportion of the three periods in which high quality is produced; and
Pr(E) is the probability that—or the proportion of observations in which—entry occurs in the
third period. Weights are also normalized so that δ = (1− α− γ).
Using the parameters chosen for the experiment, we calculate the buyer’s theoretical welfare
by computing the equilibrium values of D, Q and Pr(E) for each treatment and then evaluating
buyer’s welfare in each treatment for the welfare function weights implied by the two cases
mentioned above: case i) α = γ = 13 ; and case ii) α = γ =
1
2 . We report the buyer’s theoretical
welfare levels in these two cases in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 about here.
In case i) where buyers care about entry, quality and transfers equally, we find the highest
buyer welfare in the HM treatment (when B = β = 2, W = 0.71), where the theoretical
equilibrium frequency of entry is largest. On the other hand, in case ii) where buyers do
not care about entry directly, but only about quality and transfers instead, buyer’s welfare is
maximized in the LM treatment (when B = 2 and β = 1, W = 0.73), where the possibility of
entry constrains bids and increases quality. Importantly, in both cases we consider that having
an incentive mechanism in place increases buyer’s welfare. To determine whether a similar result
holds in our data, we next consider the empirical analogue of our theoretical buyer’s welfare
function. We measure quality, Q, by the average proportion of winning firms providing high
quality across all three periods. We measure entry probability, Pr(E), as the average proportion
of Entrant firms entering the Period 3 auction. As our measure of buyer’s transfers, we calculate
D according to the formula described above. Table 9 reports our empirical estimates of buyer’s
welfare.
Insert Table 9 about here.
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As with theoretical welfare, for both sets of weights considered buyers can always achieve
higher welfare with an incentive mechanism than without. In contrast to our theoretical analysis,
however, buyer’s welfare is always maximized in the MM treatment, where Entrant firms are
given neither the highest nor lowest possible score. This difference is likely due to Entrant firms
basing their entry decisions on the reimbursement multiplier to a lesser extent than our simple
theoretical framework predicts. For example, entering the Period 3 auction with probability of
less than one when the Entrant firm’s reimbursement multiplier is relatively high (HM), as we
observe in the data, reduces the empirical welfare advantage of HM over MM when buyers care
about entry directly.
Result 4: Introducing an incentive mechanism increases buyer’s welfare, whether or not
the buyer cares directly about the likelihood of entry.
3.5 Predictions and behavior
In this subsection we compare the experimental results with our theoretical prediction. The
most evident inconsistencies between predictions and actual behavior appear in bidding behavior
and quality provision. First, strong price competition does not emerge as subjects overbid
especially in Period 1 (Period 2) in the Baseline and HM (LM) treatments (see Table C1 in the
Appendix). Second, quality provision is higher than expected in Period 2 of the HM and MM
treatments. In the LM treatment subjects seem to behave according to the first equilibrium
discussed in Section 2.2.3 above, with large winning bids and high quality provision in Period
1, though in Period 2 the provision of high quality is lower than expected (see also Tables C1
and C2 in the Appendix). The behavior observed in the MM treatment is consistent with the
theoretical predictions for the entrant accommodation equilibrium (introduced in Section 2.2.2),
with participants bidding low prices in Period 1 and exploiting it in Period 2 – they accommodate
the entrant by producing low quality in Period 2. Even if in this latter period high quality was
less frequent than in the equivalent period of the HM treatment (where entrant accommodation
is the predicted strategy), high quality production in the MM is still higher than expected. In
summary, subjects on average bid less aggressively and are more likely to produce high quality
than theory predicts. Possible explanations for these inconsistencies are a limited ability to apply
backward induction – perhaps due to the complexity of the game – as well as risk aversion or
self-image motives.
The first explanation can only partially account for the reported inconsistencies. Even if a
small share of subjects produce high quality when this is not a profit-maximizing strategy (e.g.
in Period 3), most of them seem to understand the game incentives. For instance, entry is lower
whenever entry-deterrence is the most commonly played strategy (e.g. in the LM treatment)
and the winning bids get close to the low-quality production cost in the last period of all the
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treatments.
Asymmetries in risk aversion may explain non-aggressive bidding in our context as more
risk averse bidders may lower their profits to improve the chance of winning (Campo 2012).
In order to test this hypothesis, we first regress the winning bids at each bidding stage on our
measure of participants’ risk aversion (this measure is explained in footnote 30), controlling for
a set of treatment dummies and the round of the observation. Results are reported in Table C2
in the Appendix and show that risk aversion has the expected sign but is not significant, leading
us to exclude risk aversion as a primary explanation for the discrepancies between theory and
behavior.
Another potential explanation for prudent bidding may be framing. We framed our ex-
periment as a procurement auction, which – as Seifert and Strecker (2003) argue – may lead
participants to bid more defensively than in alternative frames such as sales auctions. They
show that the “sales” vs. “procurement” auction frame affects deviations from the dominant
strategy, with participants bidding aggressively in a sales context and defensively in a procure-
ment context. In addition, as overbidding (i.e. bidding defensively —above the private cost)
especially occurs in our experiment in Periods 1 and 2, subjects may perceive higher winning
chances if they bid less aggressively.
We also check whether the probability of choosing high quality is affected by participants’
risk aversion. Table C3 in the Appendix shows that risk aversion negatively predicts high-
quality production in Periods 1 and 2. Considering within-treatment patterns, less risk-averse
participants seem to provide high-quality more often in the periods and treatments where they
are less expected to do so, i.e. Periods 1 and 2 of the Baseline treatment and Period 2 of the HM
treatment (results available upon request). This may suggest that when the cost of deviating
from equilibrium increases, the more risk-averse subjects are those more likely to play Nash.
The effects of risk aversion are robust to the inclusion among the controls of the bid pre-
viously submitted by the winner (Table C4 in the Appendix). The previous bid has negative
effects on the quality produced in Periods 2 and 3, highlighting that the subjects winning the
auction with large bids are more likely to provide low-quality in order to maximize profits. This
evidence, jointly with the negligible fraction of subjects producing high quality in the last Pe-
riod, would also reduce the role of self-image motives in explaining why high quality is produced
when it is not profit-maximizing to do so.
4 Related literature
Our work focuses on past-performance based incentive mechanisms and transparent selection
rules to which the buyer can (or must) commit, as is often the case for large corporations and
government procurement.
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Closer to our paper are the laboratory experiments by Brosig and Reiss (2007) and Brosig-
Koch and Heinrich (2014). The former analyzes capacity-constrained suppliers’ decisions to
enter and bid in the various stages of a sequential procurement game. It finds that entry
and bidding in the sequential procurement auctions are indeed affected by the opportunity
cost of early bidding generated by the capacity constraints. It also finds that entry decisions
and average bids systematically deviate from equilibrium predictions, and that giving subject
additional information on winners and prices tends to reduce the extent of this deviation. The
latter asks what would happen if transparency rules that impose open price competition were
removed and more discretion was left to public buyers, so that information on past behavior
could matter for supplier selection. It finds that when buyers have discretion to choose among
sellers, the latter invest in providing high quality. In contrast, when buyers lack the discretion
needed to reward past behavior, sellers provide instead low quality to reduce short-term costs.
Consequently, in the absence of a structured mechanisms rewarding past performance (such as
the one discussed in this paper) buyer discretion increases market efficiency, with the benefits
accruing entirely to buyers. Our study complements these previous studies as it also deals
with entry decisions and past performance in a sequential laboratory procurement game. Our
setup, however, is rather different (no capacity constraints, new entrant at the last stage, and
pre-announced bid subsidies for past quality provision), as are the main research questions we
focus on.
Related to our work are also experimental studies of one-shot and finitely repeated homo-
geneous good Bertrand price competition, as they share several features with our procurement
game. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000, 2002) study finite-price one-shot homogeneous Bertrand
games, repeated to allow for learning but with random and anonymous re-matching between
the repetitions, that can be alternatively interpreted as homogeneous Bertrand competition
with discrete prices or as first-price sealed bid procurement auctions. They find that only by
increasing the number of competitors to three or more is the Bertrand equilibrium reached
after learning, and that disclosing the losing bids in previous rounds leads to higher prices than
only disclosing the past winning bids. Even though our environment is more complex than a
one-shot Bertrand game (three repetitions in each round, with possible entry in the third, and
quality choices), the fact that we observe prices consistently above the Bertrand solution in
our Baseline treatment—the most closely related to a one-shot Bertrand game—can be seen as
consistent with their results, as the first stages of each round are similar to a Bertrand duopoly
and information on losing bids is disclosed after each bidding stage. This suggests that with
more competitors, or without disclosing past losing bids, in our Baseline treatment bids would
possibly be lower. On the other hand, our finding that competition seemingly increases with
the introduction of transparent past-performance based mechanisms, leading to higher quality
but not higher prices, suggests that these mechanisms, by introducing complexity in terms of
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multidimensional and intertemporal competition, may have effects similar to an increase in the
number of competitors or the non-disclosure of losing bids. Our result is also consistent with
several previous experimental studies, starting with Mason et al. (1992) and including Fon-
seca and Norman (2008), Boone et al. (2012), Dugar and Mitra (2016), addressing the effect
of asymmetry in static and finitely repeated oligopolies and finding that it typically increases
competition. In particular, the fact that we find more entry in HM than in Baseline appears in
line with Dugar and Mitra’s (2016) finding that subjects play the asymmetric Bertrand solution
more often the larger the cost asymmetry among players. In contrast to these studies, however,
in our treatments with a past-performance based mechanism the asymmetry between incum-
bents is not exogenous, but endogenously generated by the decision of the supplier to invest,
provide high quality and earn the bid subsidy for the following period.
Closely related to our study is the recent strand of literature that focuses on past performance
in procurement. Examples here include Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009), Board (2011), and
Albano et al. (2017). Overall, these papers suggest that when important dimensions of the
exchange are not contractible and there are many competing suppliers, a dynamic incentive
mechanism based on past performance must complement standard competitive auctions to
obtain decent value for money. In contrast to our study, however, none of these papers directly
focuses on the consequences of dynamic incentive mechanisms for the entry of new firms.
Finally, on the empirical side outside of a laboratory environment, we are aware of only two
studies that shed light on issues closely related to our paper: Koning and Van de Meerendonk
(2014) and Decarolis et al. (2016). The former study documents an improvement in service
quality following an increase in the scoring-weight given to supplier, in the scoring rule of public
procurements of work-to-welfare programs. The latter study documents a significant increase
in quality following the announcement of the introduction of a past-performance based vendor
rating system in a large utility company, not followed by a corresponding increase in price. Both
of these empirical studies appear broadly consistent with our experimental results.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we ask whether the use of indicators based on past performance always entails a
trade-off between increased quality provision and reduced entry of new suppliers in procurement
markets. This question is important to private and government procurement design, and is at
the center of a transatlantic policy debate as current regulations in the US and Europe reflect
differing answers. In the US, where past-performance based mechanisms are currently required
in Federal procurement, the Senate recently expressed concerns that such past-performance
based selection criteria could hinder small businesses’ ability to enter and successfully compete
for contracts. On the other hand, in Europe, where regulators explicitly prohibit the use of past-
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performance indicators as criteria for selecting contractors on the grounds that they discriminate
against cross-border entrants, public buyers and their national representatives have had recent
limited success in overturning the prohibition.
We have investigated this question experimentally, augmenting a simple repeated procure-
ment game with quality choices and potential entry by a more efficient supplier. Our treatments
differed in the presence and design of a past-performance based mechanism that rewards high
quality provision in a transparent way, i.e. with a pre-announced rule that assigns a bid subsidy
for the subsequent procurement auction to suppliers that provide high quality in the current
period.
Our results indicate that poorly calibrated mechanisms may indeed hinder entry, but that
a trade-off between quality and entry is not necessary. To the contrary, we find that a well
calibrated mechanism, in which new entrants with no history of past performance are awarded
a moderate or high score – as is sometimes the case in private sector vendor rating systems or,
for example, with point systems for drivers’ licenses – actually fosters entry and, at the same
time, delivers a substantial increase in quality.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that the increase in both costly quality provision and
in entry made possible by properly calibrated incentive mechanisms may come at very little
cost to the buyer. In our data, the increase in total cost to buyers is always mild and, in some
cases, non-existent when the incentive mechanism is introduced, even when both costly quality
provision and entry increase substantially. The introduction of well calibrated bid subsidies for
good past performance appears therefore to benefit the buyer by driving winning bids down
enough to fully offset the potential increase in procurement costs due to bid subsidies and the
costly quality provision they generate. This “nirvana” result for the buyer has already found
some confirmation in the field, has obvious implication for public and private buyers, but is
rather puzzling from a theoretical perspective. Additional experimental and field work appears
therefore warranted to further test its robustness and to identify the driving forces behind it.
Summing up, our results imply that there need not be a trade-off between the use of appropri-
ately designed past-performance based mechanisms and entry by new firms into a procurement
market. A well calibrated mechanism based on past-performance may instead increase entry
and quality provision simultaneously, without increasing the cost for the procurer. If confirmed
in further studies, our findings suggest that the emphasis placed on past performance by the
revised Federal Acquisition Regulation and by private procurer is fully justified, and that Euro-
pean regulators may have been imposing large deadweight losses on their citizens by forbidding
the use of past-performance indicators as selection criteria in public procurement. They also
suggest that policy makers and regulators may want to refocus their attention on finding the
past-performance based mechanisms that best suit their specific goals, rather than on whether
such mechanisms should be allowed at all.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary of treatments 
Treatment Incumbents Entrant Participants Sessions 
 Multiplier CH CL Multiplier CH CL   
HM 2 2 1.5 2 2 0.125 51 3 
MM  2 2 1.5 1.5 2 0.125 60 3 
LM  2 2 1.5 1 2 0.125 42 2 
Baseline 1 2 1.5 1 2 0.125 90 4 
 
 
Table 2: Proportion of winning firms producing high quality 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods 
Baseline 0.18 0.09 0.06 0.11 (0.047) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) 
LM  0.82 0.57 0.14 0.51 (0.018) (0.048) (0.024) (0.018) 
MM  0.77 0.49 0.17 0.48 (0.010) (0.075) (0.026) (0.031) 
HM 0.78 0.60 0.09 0.49 (0.04) (0.025) (0.040) (0.018) 
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
Notes: [1] Robust standard errors resulting from estimations of means over treatments, 
clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [2] The last column, "All Periods," reports 
the total number of times high quality was produced by the winning firm divided by the 
total number of periods. 
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Table 3: Quality provision, by period and treatment 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods 
    
 
LM  0.51*** 0.55*** 0.10* 0.73*** 
 (0.043) (0.063) (0.061) (0.110) 
MM  0.53*** 0.50*** 0.14** 0.69*** 
 (0.050) (0.075) (0.060) (0.116) 
HM 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.04 0.69*** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.067) (0.111) 
Round -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** -0.02*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present marginal effects estimates from a (separate) 
probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy taking the value one 
whenever the winning firm produced high quality in the relevant period 
(column heading). [2] The fourth column presents results of a tobit regression 
in which the dependent variable is the n. of times high quality has been 
produced by the winning firm standardized by the n. of periods. [3] Robust 
standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [4] *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4: Entry propensity 
  Period 3 
Baseline 0.61 (0.019) 
LM  0.42 (0.161) 
MM  0.69 (0.046) 
HM 0.67 (0.033) 
Observations 1,011 
Notes: Robust standard errors resulting from 
estimation of means over treatments, clustered by 
session, appear in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Entry, by treatment 
    
LM  -0.19 
 (0.125) 
MM  0.10** 
 (0.040) 
HM 0.08** 
 (0.031) 
Round -0.02*** 
 (0.006) 
  
Observations 1,011 
Notes: [1] Reported values are marginal effects from a  
probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy 
taking the value one whenever the Entrant firm entered 
Period 3 rather than staying out. [2] Robust standard 
errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6: Buyer’s transfer, by period and treatments  
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average Over Periods 1 to 3 
Baseline 
2.14 1.97 1.58 1.90 
(0.079) (0.092) (0.106) (0.091) 
LM  
1.87 2.38 1.98 2.08 
(0.115) (0.130) (0.168) (0.026) 
MM  
1.67 2.33 1.93 1.98 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.135) (0.083) 
HM 
1.91 2.39 2.11 2.14 
(0.085) (0.062) (0.068) (0.064) 
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,010 1,011 
Notes: Robust standard errors resulting from estimation of means over 
treatments, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Average buyer's transfer, by period and treatment  
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Average Over 
Periods 1-3 
LM  -0.28** 0.41*** 0.40** 0.18* 
 (0.111) (0.127) (0.157) (0.085) 
MM  -0.46*** 0.38*** 0.37** 0.10 
 (0.103) (0.110) (0.158) (0.114) 
HM -0.22** 0.43*** 0.55*** 0.25** 
 (0.101) (0.097) (0.115) (0.099) 
Round -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant 2.27*** 2.16*** 1.77*** 2.07*** 
 (0.084) (0.105) (0.124) (0.101) 
     
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,010 1,011 
R-squared 0.191 0.067 0.116 0.077 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression using as the dependent variable 
winning bids in the relevant period (column heading). [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by 
session, appear in parentheses. [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. [4] The dependent variable 
in this table is the average buyer costs (transfers) over the tree periods. 
 
Table 8: Buyer’s theoretical welfare  
 Baseline LM  MM  HM 
α = γ = δ= 1/3 0.389 0.488 0.599 0.710 
α = γ = ½; δ = 0 0.333 0.731 0.648 0.565 
Notes: [1] Each cell reports buyer’s theoretical welfare evaluated according to the model (described in text).  [2] In this 
theoretical welfare function: α is the weight the buyer places on total transfer, expressed as a discount below the maximum 
possible transfer without bid subsidies; γ is the weight the buyer places on high quality provision; and δ is the weight 
placed on entry per se. 
 
Table 9: Buyer’s empirical welfare   
 Baseline LM  MM  HM 
α = γ = δ= 1/3 0.433 0.489 0.577*** 0.561*** 
α = γ = ½; δ = 0 0.344 0.524*** 0.520*** 0.507*** 
Notes: [1] Each cell reports buyer’s empirical welfare (described in text) evaluated using our experimental data.  [2] In 
this empirical welfare function: α is the weight the buyer places on total transfer, expressed as a discount below the 
maximum possible transfer without bid subsidies; γ is the weight the buyer places on high quality provision; and δ is the 
weight placed on entry per se. [3] significance levels from t-tests comparing LM , MM or HM treatments vs. Baseline 
with standard errors clustered by session are reported;  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Instructions Appendix 
(Translated into English)  
A. Instructions 
Welcome! 
This is a study about how people make decisions.  The study is being financed by the Swedish 
Competition Authority and by EIEF.  In this experiment you will participate in auctions allocating 
contracts for the production of a good or service.  If you pay attention to the instructions they will 
help you make decisions and earn a reasonable amount of money. Your earnings from this 
experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of today's session. 
We ask you to please turn off your cell phones and to refrain from talking with other persons 
present in the room until the end of the experiment.  If you have questions, please raise your hand 
and one of the experimenters will respond to you privately. 
Today’s experiment consists of [12,15] rounds. Every round is composed of three auctions.  At the 
beginning of each round every participant in the room will be assigned randomly and anonymously 
two other participants.  Each of the resulting groups of three participants will take part in a 
sequence of three auctions of which each round is composed.  After the three auctions are 
concluded, a new round will begin by again randomly and anonymously re-assigning participants 
into groups of three.  This process continues until all [12, 15] round have been completed. 
At the beginning of each round, each of the three participants in a group will be assigned (as 
always, randomly) the role of one of three firms: Firm A, Firm B or Firm C.  Firms A and B will 
participate in all three auctions comprising the round.  Firm C, on the other hand, can participate in 
the third auction if they choose to do so, but cannot participate in the first two auctions.  Firm C 
must wait for Firms A and B to complete the first two auctions.  The institution that conducts the 
auctions and that acquires the good or service produced by the firms is the computer. 
 
Auction 1 
At the beginning of the first auction Firms A and B submit a bid, i.e. the price in return for which 
they are willing to produce the good requested by the purchaser, bearing in mind that the maximum 
allowable bid is 4.5: 
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• The firm that submits the lowest bid (i.e., that offers to produce the good or service for the 
lowest price) wins the auction. 
• If both firms submit the same bid, the winning firm will be selected randomly. 
The winning firm must also make a production decision: which quality level to produce.  For Firm 
A and Firm B it is possible to produce a high quality good/service at a cost of 2, or to produce low 
quality at a cost of 1.5.  An auction is over when all the participating firms have submitted their 
bids and the winning firm has made its production decision. 
The earnings for the winning firm from the first auction will be the winning firm’s bid minus the 
cost of production.  If, for example, the winning firm submitted a bid of 3 and decided to produce 
high quality at a cost of 2, then this firm’s profit will be 3 – 2  = 1.  The firm that did not win the 
auction (submitted a bid higher than 3) will earn a profit of 0 from this auction. 
The buyer prefers high quality to low quality and, as explained in more detail below, rewards in the 
subsequent auction firms with a good reputation—i.e., those that in the previous period produced 
high quality—with a bonus on their bid when they win. 
At the end of each auction, including this first auction, all three firms will be shown all submitted 
bids and the quality level which the winning firm decided to produce.  
 
Auction 2 
As in the first auction, only Firm A and Firm B participate in Auction 2.  Both Firms A and B must 
submit a bid keeping in mind that the maximum possible bid is 4.5: 
• The firm that submits the lowest bid (i.e., that offers to produce the good or service for the 
lowest price) wins the auction. 
• If both firms submit the same bid, the winning firm will be selected randomly. 
The firm that won Auction 1, if they produced high quality in that auction, has a good reputation in 
this second auction.  What this means is that if this same firm wins Auction 2 they will be given a 
bonus equal to 100% of their winning bid.  For example, if the bid submitted by a firm with good 
reputation is 2 and this bid wins Auction 2 (e.g., because the other firm submitted a bid larger than 
2) the bonus paid to the winning firm with good reputation will be 100% of 2, i.e., 2, and the price 
paid to this winning firm for producing by the purchaser will be 2 + 2 = 4. 
The firm winning Auction 2 must choose whether to produce high quality, at a cost of 2, or to 
produce low quality at a cost of 1.5, exactly as in Auction 1. The winning firm’s profit from this 
second auction will be the price offered plus the bonus (if the winning firm has a good reputation, 
i.e. had won auction 1 and produced high quality there), minus the cost of production. Continuing 
with the previous example: if the firm with good reputation wins Auction 2 with a bid of 2, it 
receives its bid plus the bonus of 2, for a total revenue of 2 + 2 = 4. It must then decide whether to 
produce high or low quality in this second auction. If it decides to produce high quality also in this 
second race, its profit will be equal to the price with the bonus, minus the cost of producing high 
quality, that is, 4-2 = 2, and it will also have good reputation in the subsequent, third, auction. If it 
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decides instead to produce low quality following Auction 2, it will now have a profit of 4 - 1.5 = 
2.5, but will not have a good reputation (nor a bonus) in the third auction. 
If the winning firm in Auction 2 does not have a good reputation (because it did not win the first 
auction or because it did not produce high quality there) it will not receive a bonus. In this case, its 
profit from the second auction will be its winning bid minus the cost of production. For example, if 
its winning bid was 2 and it decides to produce low quality, it will earn a profit of 2 - 1.5 = 0.5 and 
will not have a good reputation in Auction 3.  On the other hand, if it decides to produce high 
quality its profit in the second auction will be 2 - 2 = 0, but it will have a good reputation in the 
third auction. 
Consequently, if neither Firm A nor Firm B has a good reputation at the beginning Auction 2, they 
will compete on equal footing. If one of them has a good reputation, however, the firm with a good 
reputation will have an advantage:  getting a bonus if it wins this second period. 
At the end of the second auction, all firms will be able to see all bids submitted, which firm won the 
auction and the quality level the winning firm chose to produce. 
 
Auction 3 
At the start of the third auction, having observed what happened in the two previous races, Firm C 
must decide whether to participate in Auction 3 along with Firms A and B.  If Firm C decides to 
participate, it will receive a bonus equal to [100%, 50%, 0%] of its bid if it wins the auction. For 
example, if Firm C submits a bid of 2 and wins Auction 3, its bonus will be [2,1, 0], and it will be 
paid 2 +[2, 1, 0] = [4, 3, 2] by the purchaser. Firm C’s profit from this third race will be [4, 3, 2] 
minus the cost of production which, as will be explained below, may be different from the 
production costs of Firms A and B.  If, instead, Firm C decides to not participate in Auction 3, it 
will earn 1 euro. If Firm C decides to participate in Auction 3 it will have to submit a bid in the 
same manner as Firms A and B with a maximum possible bid of 4.5. 
  
In this third auction: 
• The firm submitting the lowest bid (i.e., has offered to produce the good or service at the 
lowest price) wins. 
• If more than one firm submits the same lowest bid, the winner will be randomly selected 
among these firms. 
The winning firm must decide the quality level at which to produce.  If Firm C is the winning firm, 
it costs of production are as follows: 
• Producing low quality entails a production cost of 0.125 
• Producing high quality entails a production cost of 2. 
If either Firm A or Firm B win the third auction, its production costs are as before: producing high 
quality costs the firm 2, while the cost of producing low quality is 1.5. 
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Total earnings 
At the end of today’s session, one of the [12, 15] rounds will be randomly selected and each 
participant will be paid their overall earnings from all three auctions comprising this randomly 
chosen round.  Participants assigned the role of Firm A or B will be paid the total euros earned in 
the three auctions. Participants assigned the role of Firm C will be paid 1 euro for each of the first 
two auctions plus 1 euro for the third auction if he/she decided not to participate.  If he/she did 
participate in Auction 3, his or her earnings from this third auction will be either 0 if he or she did 
not win, or his or her bid plus the bonus minus the costs of production. 
In addition to the earnings in the randomly selected round, all participants will be paid 5 euros as 
compensation for participation. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRMS A AND B 
 
You are Firm A or Firm B.  In this experiment you will take part in a series of auctions to award 
the production of a good or a service. The experiment consists of [12, 15] rounds. In each round 
you will participate in three auctions taking place one after the other.  At the start of the first 
auction you must submit a bid—the price for which you will produce a good or service. When both 
you and the other firm have submitted your bids: 
• The company submitting the lowest bid (i.e., has offered to produce the good or 
service at the lowest price) wins the auction. 
• If both firms submit the same bid, one firm will be randomly selected to win the 
auction. 
If you are the firm that wins, you must make a production decision. You can either produce a high 
level of quality at a cost of 2, or you can produce a low quality good or service at a cost of 1.5.  
When all bids are submitted and production decisions are made, the auction is over and all firms 
will learn all bids that were submitted as well as the quality level production decision of the 
winning firm. 
You will then begin the second auction. Again, in Auction 2 only Firms A and B participate.  As in 
the first auction, you submit a bid.  If the firm that won the first auction produced high quality in 
Auction 1, in this second auction it will have a good reputation.  This good reputation gives the 
firm a bonus of 100% of its (winning) bid, if it wins Auction 2.  For example, if the bid submitted 
by a firm with good reputation in the second auction is 2, and this bid wins the auction, the bonus 
will also be 2 and the amount that this firm will be paid by the purchaser is 4.  Its profit will be its 
bid plus the bonus minus the cost of production.  
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If the firm that won the first auction did not produce high quality, it will not have a good reputation 
in Auction 2 and it will not receive a bonus for winning, i.e., Firms A and B will participate on 
equal footing in the second auction. 
When both you and the other firm have submitted your bids: 
• The company submitting the lowest bid (i.e., has offered to produce the good or 
service at the lowest price) wins the auction. 
• If both firms submit the same bid, one firm will be randomly selected to win the 
auction. 
If you are the firm that wins, you must make a production decision. You can either produce a high 
level of quality at a cost of 2, or you can produce a low quality good or service at a cost of 1.5.  
When all bids are submitted and production decisions are made, the auction is over and all firms 
will learn all bids that were submitted as well as the quality level production decision of the 
winning firm. 
At the start of the third auction, Firm C must decide whether or not to participate.  If Firm C 
decides to participate, you will have two competitors in Auction 3. In the third auction, you submit 
a bid (as before): 
• The company submitting the lowest bid (i.e., has offered to produce the good or 
service at the lowest price) wins the auction. 
• If more than one firm submits the same lowest bid, one firm will be randomly 
selected from among those submitting the lowest bid to win the auction. 
If you win this third auction and you also won the second auction and produced high quality there, 
you have good reputation. You will be paid the bonus for good reputation, as described above, in 
addition to your winning bid by the purchaser. 
Your earnings in a round are the sum of what you earned over all three auctions comprising a 
round. 
In summary, if you win the first auction your earnings from Auction 1 will be your bid minus the 
cost of production.  If you choose to produce with high quality in Auction 1, in the subsequent 
auction (Auction 2) you will have a good reputation and will be given a bonus if you win:  your 
earnings in Auction 2 will be your winning bid plus the bonus minus the cost of production.  If you 
choose to produce low quality in Auction 1, in the subsequent auction (Auction 2) you will not have 
a good reputation and will receive no bonus for winning the second auction.  If you win the second 
auction and choose to produce high quality there, you will have a good reputation in the third 
auction and again receive a bonus for winning Auction 3. If, however, you win Auction 2 and 
produce low quality, you will not have good reputation in Auction 3, and so receive no bonus for 
winning the third auction. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRM C 
You are Firm C. In this experiment you will take part in a series of auctions to award the production 
of a good or a service. The experiment consists of [12, 15] rounds. Since you are Firm C you cannot 
participate in the first two auctions of each round but will earn 1 euro for each of these auctions. 
You can, however, participate in the third auction if you choose to. 
If you decide not to participate in the third auction, you will earn an additional 1 euro. If you 
decide to participate in Auction 3, you forgo this 1 euro and must submit a bid. If your bid is the 
lowest of the three bids made (yours and those of Firms A and B), you win the auction and will be 
paid your winning bid plus a bonus equal to [100%, 50%, 0%] of your bid. For example, if your 
winning bid is 2, 2 + [2, 1 , 0] = [4, 3, 2] will be the amount you are paid by the purchaser. 
If you are the winning firm, you must decide the level of quality to produce. You face the 
following production costs: 
• Producing low quality costs 0.125. 
• Producing high quality costs 2. 
Your earnings in a round will be: 1 euro for the first auction, 1 euro for the second auction.  For 
Auction 3, if you decide not to participate you will again earn 1 euro for the third auction. If, 
however, you participate in the third auction, your earnings from Auction 3 will be either: 0, if you 
lose; or your bid plus the bonus minus the cost of production if you win.  
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B. Individual Screens 
[Screen 1A:  shown to Incumbent firms only]: 
• You have been assigned the role of [Firm A, Firm B] 
• Click “Proceed” to begin 
 
[Screen 1B:  shown to Entrant firms only]: 
• You have been assigned the role of Firm C. 
• You can only participate in the third auction. 
• Click “Proceed,” then please wait patiently for the first two auctions to conclude. 
•  You will be informed when the third auction is about to begin. 
 
[Screen 2:  Auction 1 bid submission screen]: 
• Please enter your bid below. 
• Then, click “Submit bid.” 
Your bid: ___ 
 
[Screen 3:  Auction 1 waiting screen, shown to losing Incumbent firm only]  
• You did not win the auction. 
• Please click "Proceed" and wait while the winning firm makes its production decision. 
 
[Screen 4:  shown to winning firm only] 
• You won the auction. 
• Please select which quality level to produce below. 
• Then, click “Proceed.” 
Produce: 
[order of options randomized] 
o High quality 
o Low quality 
 
[Screen 5:  Auction 1 summary, shown to all three firms] 
Results of Auction 1 
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• Firm A bid: __ 
• Firm B bid: __ 
• The winning firm was [Firm A, Firm B] 
• The winning firm produced [low quality, high quality] 
 
 
[Screen 7: Auction 2 bid screen, shown to Incumbent firms only] 
• You [have, do not have] reputation. 
• Please enter your bid below 
• Then, click “Submit bid.” 
Your bid: ___ 
 
 
[Screen 8:  Auction 2 waiting screen, shown to losing Incumbent firm only]  
• You did not win the auction. 
• Please click "Proceed" and wait while the winning firm makes its production decision. 
 
 
[Screen 9:  shown to winning firm only] 
• You won the auction. 
• Please select which quality level to produce below. 
• Then, click “Proceed.” 
Produce: 
 [order of options randomized] 
o High quality 
o Low quality 
 
[Screen 10:  Auction 2 summary, shown to all three firms] 
Results of Auction 2 
• Firm A bid: __ 
• Firm B bid: __ 
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• The winning firm was [Firm A, Firm B] 
• The winning firm produced [low quality, high quality] 
 
 
[Screen 11: Auction 3 Entry decision screen, shown only to Entrant firm] 
• Auction 3 is now about to take place. 
• Please choose whether you will enter auction 3 below. 
• After you have chosen, please click “Proceed.” 
[order of options randomized] 
o Do not enter 
o Enter the auction 
 
 
[Screen 12: Auction 3 Entry decision announcement, shown to all three firms] 
• Firm C decided [not to enter, to enter] the auction. 
• Please click “Proceed.” 
 
 
[Screen 13A: Entrant firm Auction 3 bid submission screen, shown only to Entrant firm] 
• Your entrant multiplier is __. 
• Please enter your bid below. 
• Then, click Submit bid. 
 
Your bid: ___ 
 
[Screen 13B: Incumbent firm Auction 3 bid submission screen, shown only to Incumbent firms] 
• Your entrant multiplier is __. 
• Please enter your bid below. 
• Then, click Submit bid. 
 
Your bid: ___ 
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[Screen 14: Auction 3 summary, shown to all three firms] 
Results of Auction 3 
• Firm A bid __ 
• Firm B bid __ 
• Firm C [entered / did not enter] 
• The winning firm was [Firm A, Firm B, Firm C] 
• The winning firm produced [low quality, high quality] 
 
 
[Screen 15: Profit summary over all three auctions, shown to all three firms] 
• If this round is selected, you will earn __ euro 
• You earned __ from auction 1 
• You earned __ from auction 2 
• You earned __ from auction 3 
 
• Please click “Proceed” and wait for the next round to begin. 
 
 
[Screen 16: Profit summary waiting screen, shown to all three firms] 
• Please wait for all other participants to view their potential profits for this round. 
The next round will automatically start when everyone has clicked “Proceed.”  
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Robustness Appendix 
Not For Publication 
 
 
Section A: Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests 
 
Table A1: Mann-Whitney tests on quality provision 
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 BA vs LM  360 z-stat -14.118 -11.839 -3.099 168 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.002 LM  vs. MM  168 z-stat 1.061 1.601 -0.862 264 Prob>|z|  0.289 0.109 0.389 MM vs. HM 264 z-stat -0.212 -2.319 2.639 219 Prob>|z|  0.832 0.020 0.008 BA vs. MM  360 z-stat -14.897 -11.150 -4.477 264 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 BA vs. HM 360 z-stat -14.393 -13.010 -1.358 219 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.174 LM vs. HM 168 z-stat 0.837 -0.529 1.581 219 Prob>|z|  0.402 0.597 0.114 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labelling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” 
treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High 
Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2:  Mann-Whitney tests on entry 
 
Pairwise comparison Obs Non-par test (z, p) BA vs LM  360 3.991 168 0.000 LM  vs. MM  168 -5.481 264 0.000 MM vs. HM 264 0.426 219 0.670 BA vs. MM  360 -2.086 264 0.037 BA vs. HM 360 -1.521 219 0.128 LM vs. HM 168 -4.881 219 0.000 
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Notes: Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; 
LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier 
Bonus” Treatment. 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Mann-Whitney tests on buyers’ transfers  
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Average 
Periods 1-3 
BA vs LM  
360 z-stat 7.58 -2.91 -5.10 -3.20 
168 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 
LM  vs. MM  
168 z-stat 4.01 0.03 -0.16 1.40 
264 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.980 0.875 0.161 
MM vs. HM 
264 z-stat -5.49 -0.09 -3.30 -2.96 
219 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.928 0.001 0.003 
BA vs. MM  
360 z-stat 12.26 -2.98 -7.23 -2.38 
264 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.003 0.000 0.017 
BA vs. HM 
360 z-stat 7.32 -3.70 -9.83 -5.68 
219 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LM vs. HM 
168 z-stat -1.29 0.08 -2.57 -1.24 
219 Prob>|z|  0.199 0.933 0.010 0.215 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” 
treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High 
Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
Table A4: Mann-Whitney tests on profits, pooling over roles 
Pairwise comparison 
Including w  Excluding w Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All 3 periods  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All 3 periods BA vs LM  7.180 -0.518 -2.590 2.234 11.837 2.989 -0.425 5.703 (0.000) (0.604) (0.010) (0.026) (0.000) (0.003) (0.671) (0.000) LM  vs. MM  1.307 -0.137 3.111 1.447 2.203 -0.207 0.929 0.162 (0.191) (0.891) (0.002) (0.148) (0.028) (0.836) (0.353) (0.871) MM vs. HM -1.558 0.384 -1.191 -1.234 -2.274 0.961 -1.002 -1.431 (0.119) (0.701) (0.234) (0.217) (0.023) (0.337) (0.317) (0.153) BA vs. MM  9.396 -0.693 1.103 4.234 15.779 3.273 0.655 6.058 (0.000) (0.488) (0.270) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.513) (0.000) BA vs. HM 7.686 -0.420 -0.106 2.670 13.035 3.922 -0.277 4.252 (0.000) (0.675) (0.915) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) LM vs. HM -0.171 0.242 1.985 0.463 0.039 0.696 0.126 -0.900 (0.864) (0.809) (0.047) (0.644) (0.969) (0.487) (0.900) (0.368) 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  Ba = “Baseline” 
treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High 
Multiplier Bonus” Treatment.  [2] z-scores from Mann-Whitney tests reported; Prob > |z| appears in parentheses.   
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Table A5: Mann-Whitney tests on buyers’ empirical welfare  
  α = γ = δ= 1/3 α = γ = ½; δ = 0 
Pairwise comparison Obs Mean Std dev z-score (p) Mean Std dev z-score (p) 
BA vs LM  
360 0.432 0.185 -3.475 0.344 0.125 -13.630 
168 0.490 0.180 (0.001) 0.524 0.130 (0.000) 
LM  vs. MM  
168 0.490 0.180 -4.626 0.524 0.130 0.539 
264 0.577 0.168 (0.000) 0.520 0.142 (0.590) 
MM vs. HM 
264 0.577 0.168 0.593 0.520 0.142 0.543 
219 0.562 0.174 (0.553) 0.508 0.134 (0.587) 
BA vs. MM  
360 0.432 0.185 -9.896 0.344 0.125 -14.719 
264 0.577 0.168 (0.000) 0.520 0.142 (0.000) 
BA vs. HM 
360 0.432 0.185 -8.457 0.344 0.125 -13.389 
219 0.562 0.174 (0.000) 0.508 0.134 (0.000) 
LM vs. HM 
168 0.490 0.180 -3.821 0.524 0.130 0.954 
219 0.562 0.174 (0.000) 0.508 0.134 (0.340) 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” 
treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High 
Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
 
Section B:  Dynamic trends in our main variables, allowing for non-linear 
variation 
 
 
Table B1: Quality provision  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods           LM  0.51*** 0.56*** 0.10* 0.72***  (0.045) (0.065) (0.061) (0.109) MM  0.54*** 0.52*** 0.14** 0.69***  (0.053) (0.074) (0.059) (0.114) HM 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.04 0.69***  (0.052) (0.060) (0.065) (0.110) Round 2 (dummy) -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.06*** -0.26***  (0.079) (0.034) (0.018) (0.062) Round 3 (dummy) -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.06*** -0.29***  (0.096) (0.052) (0.019) (0.070) Round 4 (dummy) -0.35*** -0.26*** -0.08*** -0.37***  (0.075) (0.047) (0.022) (0.073) Round 5 (dummy) -0.23*** -0.29*** -0.10*** -0.36***  (0.062) (0.039) (0.020) (0.066) Round 6 (dummy) -0.36*** -0.29*** -0.09*** -0.41***  (0.060) (0.039) (0.019) (0.076) Round 7 (dummy) -0.34*** -0.28*** -0.08*** -0.39***  (0.069) (0.032) (0.015) (0.075) Round 8 (dummy) -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.09*** -0.30***  (0.070) (0.051) (0.022) (0.068) Round 9 (dummy) -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.08*** -0.36***  (0.071) (0.053) (0.019) (0.082) Round 10 (dummy) -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.07*** -0.31***  (0.094) (0.039) (0.017) (0.080) 
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Round 11 (dummy) -0.33*** -0.25*** -0.07*** -0.35***  (0.075) (0.040) (0.018) (0.078) Round 12 (dummy) -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.07*** -0.32***  (0.089) (0.024) (0.012) (0.061) Round 13 (dummy) -0.29* -0.30*** -0.07*** -0.39***  (0.169) (0.033) (0.022) (0.077) Round 14 (dummy) -0.18 -0.30*** -0.09*** -0.37***  (0.167) (0.056) (0.017) (0.127) Round 15 (dummy) -0.42*** -0.33*** -0.09*** -0.58***  (0.086) (0.027) (0.017) (0.117)      Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present the marginal effects from an estimated probit model using as the dependent variable 
winning firms’ (binary) decision to provide high quality.  [2] The fourth column presents results of a tobit regression 
in which the dependent variable is the n. of times high quality has been produced by the winning firm standardized 
by the n. of periods. [3] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [4] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
 
Table B2: Entry decision   Period 3     LM  -0.19  (0.126) MM  0.09**  (0.044) HM 0.07**  (0.033) Round 2 (dummy) -0.13**  (0.057) Round 3 (dummy) -0.17***  (0.036) Round 4 (dummy) -0.15**  (0.065) Round 5 (dummy) -0.27***  (0.040) Round 6 (dummy) -0.25***  (0.046) Round 7 (dummy) -0.24***  (0.057) Round 8 (dummy) -0.34***  (0.063) Round 9 (dummy) -0.33***  (0.052) Round 10 (dummy) -0.31***  (0.059) Round 11 (dummy) -0.35***  (0.054) Round 12 (dummy) -0.34***  (0.076) Round 13 (dummy) -0.15***  (0.048) Round 14 (dummy) -0.25***  (0.083) Round 15 (dummy) -0.49***  (0.026)   Observations 1,011 
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Notes: [1] Each column presents the marginal effects from an estimated probit model using as the dependent variable 
Entrant firms’ (binary) decisions to enter Period 3.  [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in 
parentheses.  [3] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table B3: Buyers’ total transfers 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period3 Average Over All Periods           LM  -0.28** 0.41*** 0.40** 0.18* 
 (0.112) (0.128) (0.158) (0.085) MM  -0.47*** 0.36*** 0.34** 0.07 
 (0.098) (0.111) (0.145) (0.107) HM -0.24** 0.41*** 0.53*** 0.23** 
 (0.104) (0.100) (0.113) (0.101) Round 2 (dummy) -0.23*** -0.19 -0.26*** -0.23*** 
 (0.056) (0.122) (0.079) (0.046) Round 3 (dummy) -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.54*** -0.47*** 
 (0.064) (0.106) (0.053) (0.056) Round 4 (dummy) -0.43*** -0.59*** -0.54*** -0.52*** 
 (0.075) (0.141) (0.069) (0.077) Round 5 (dummy) -0.45*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.57*** 
 (0.077) (0.137) (0.082) (0.074) Round 6 (dummy) -0.42*** -0.57*** -0.64*** -0.54*** 
 (0.093) (0.180) (0.085) (0.107) Round 7 (dummy) -0.44*** -0.55*** -0.66*** -0.55*** 
 (0.083) (0.160) (0.090) (0.088) Round 8 (dummy) -0.42*** -0.50*** -0.63*** -0.52*** 
 (0.091) (0.159) (0.082) (0.095) Round 9 (dummy) -0.40*** -0.59*** -0.56*** -0.52*** 
 (0.074) (0.122) (0.091) (0.064) Round 10 (dummy) -0.45*** -0.56*** -0.61*** -0.54*** 
 (0.081) (0.155) (0.056) (0.079) Round 11 (dummy) -0.43*** -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.51*** 
 (0.083) (0.133) (0.087) (0.077) Round 12 (dummy) -0.47*** -0.53*** -0.65*** -0.55*** 
 (0.069) (0.147) (0.109) (0.086) Round 13 (dummy) -0.30*** -0.26* -0.23 -0.26** 
 (0.086) (0.122) (0.234) (0.092) Round 14 (dummy) -0.35*** -0.57** -0.57*** -0.50*** 
 (0.099) (0.260) (0.082) (0.124) Round 15 (dummy) -0.38*** -0.57*** -0.42*** -0.45*** 
 (0.096) (0.090) (0.119) (0.065) Constant 2.52*** 2.45*** 2.10*** 2.36*** 
 (0.106) (0.146) (0.109) (0.109)      Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 R-squared 0.245 0.076 0.086 0.151 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present simple OLS estimates using as the dependent variable buyers’ total payments (transfers) 
to winning firms in period in the column heading.  [2] The fourth column presents a similar OLS estimate, but using 
average buyers’ transfer across all three periods as the dependent variable. [3] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, 
appear in parentheses.  [4] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table B4: Firms’ profits 
 Including w Excluding w  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods                   LM  -0.20*** 0.06 0.10 -0.02 -0.20*** 0.06 0.04 -0.04  (0.040) (0.050) (0.068) (0.035) (0.040) (0.050) (0.046) (0.039) MM  -0.26*** 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.26*** 0.05 0.06 -0.05  (0.037) (0.040) (0.055) (0.042) (0.037) (0.040) (0.055) (0.042) HM -0.18*** 0.05 0.13** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.05 0.15** 0.01  (0.040) (0.038) (0.053) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.051) (0.039) Round 2 (dummy) -0.05** -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03*  (0.020) (0.044) (0.041) (0.017) (0.020) (0.044) (0.041) (0.016) Round 3 (dummy) -0.12*** -0.11** -0.06 -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.11** -0.11** -0.11***  (0.021) (0.037) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.035) (0.020) Round 4 (dummy) -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.03 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.07 -0.11***  (0.024) (0.044) (0.038) (0.026) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044) (0.024) Round 5 (dummy) -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.09* -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15***  (0.027) (0.042) (0.046) (0.032) (0.027) (0.042) (0.042) (0.030) Round 6 (dummy) -0.10** -0.14** -0.09** -0.11** -0.10** -0.14** -0.16*** -0.13***  (0.033) (0.059) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.059) (0.033) (0.035) Round 7 (dummy) -0.11*** -0.13** -0.06 -0.10** -0.11*** -0.13** -0.12** -0.12***  (0.032) (0.052) (0.051) (0.035) (0.032) (0.052) (0.050) (0.037) Round 8 (dummy) -0.11*** -0.13** -0.04 -0.10** -0.11*** -0.13** -0.14*** -0.13***  (0.032) (0.054) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.054) (0.037) (0.034) Round 9 (dummy) -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.04 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.13***  (0.030) (0.047) (0.036) (0.024) (0.030) (0.047) (0.029) (0.026) Round 10 (dummy) -0.12*** -0.15** -0.03 -0.10** -0.12*** -0.15** -0.12** -0.13***  (0.033) (0.055) (0.050) (0.034) (0.033) (0.055) (0.056) (0.039) Round 11 (dummy) -0.11*** -0.14** -0.05 -0.10** -0.11*** -0.14** -0.15** -0.13***  (0.031) (0.048) (0.053) (0.034) (0.031) (0.048) (0.053) (0.037) Round 12 (dummy) -0.13*** -0.14** -0.13** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14** -0.23*** -0.16***  (0.025) (0.054) (0.056) (0.030) (0.025) (0.054) (0.044) (0.030) Round 13 (dummy) -0.07** -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07** -0.02 -0.09 -0.06  (0.023) (0.036) (0.091) (0.040) (0.023) (0.036) (0.083) (0.038) Round 14 (dummy) -0.10* -0.12 -0.15* -0.12 -0.10* -0.12 -0.22*** -0.15*  (0.047) (0.117) (0.077) (0.076) (0.047) (0.117) (0.057) (0.069) Round 15 (dummy) -0.07 -0.10*** -0.01 -0.06** -0.07 -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.11***  (0.049) (0.029) (0.038) (0.026) (0.049) (0.029) (0.036) (0.025) Constant 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.28***  (0.039) (0.054) (0.056) (0.046) (0.039) (0.054) (0.054) (0.045)          Observations 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033 R-squared 0.042 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.119 0.011 0.015 0.027 
 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression using as the dependent variable firms’ profits.  [2] The first 
four columns include in this calculation Entrant firms’ reservation wage, w = 1, in Periods 1 and 2.  The last four 
columns exclude the reservation wage from profit calculations.  [3] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear 
in parentheses.  [4] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B5: Quality provision over 2-round bins   High Quality (Total  Over Periods 1-3)    Rounds   1 - 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 8 9 - 10 > 10        LM  1.10*** 0.86*** 0.98*** 1.20*** 1.64*** 1.41***  (0.297) (0.098) (0.195) (0.089) (0.096) (0.251) MM  1.01*** 1.21*** 1.11*** 1.34*** 1.12*** 0.98***  (0.177) (0.120) (0.164) (0.126) (0.093) (0.223) HM 1.08*** 1.18*** 0.94*** 1.12*** 1.38*** 1.16***  (0.180) (0.162) (0.143) (0.080) (0.126) (0.176) Constant 0.72*** 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.23*** 0.18* 0.27  (0.175) (0.094) (0.056) (0.071) (0.093) (0.168)        Observations 162 162 162 162 162 201 R-squared 0.25 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.48 0.31 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression restricting observations to the rounds mentioned in the column heading.   [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  [4] The dependent variable in each column is the number of periods in which high quality was produced, which can take values from 0 to 3. 
 
 
Table B6: Entry over 2-round bins   Entry between Periods 2 and 3    Rounds   1 - 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 8 9 - 10 > 10               LM  -0.16 -0.01 -0.07 -0.19 -0.35** -0.33***  (0.108) (0.086) (0.161) (0.273) (0.139) (0.040) MM  0.09 0.16* 0.08 0.15 0.07 -0.01  (0.054) (0.083) (0.051) (0.131) (0.097) (0.048) HM 0.18*** 0.18** 0.11 0.07 -0.10 -0.01  (0.041) (0.078) (0.101) (0.077) (0.059) (0.105) Constant 0.73*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.60*** 0.58***  (0.019) (0.031) (0.023) (0.062) (0.039) (0.030)        Observations 162 162 162 162 162 201 R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression restricting observations to the rounds mentioned in the column heading.   [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  [4] The dependent variable in each column is a dummy for the Entrant’s choice to enter the Period 3 auction, which takes the value of 1 if E=in and zero otherwise. 
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Table B7: Average total buyers’ transfers over 2-round bins   Average Buyers' Transfers (Periods 1-3)   Rounds   1 – 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 – 8 9 - 10 > 10               LM  0.41*** 0.21** 0.08 -0.00 0.21* 0.16*  (0.115) (0.074) (0.101) (0.097) (0.099) (0.090) MM  0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.19*  (0.120) (0.097) (0.157) (0.162) (0.135) (0.095) HM 0.52*** 0.33*** 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.20***  (0.141) (0.098) (0.120) (0.143) (0.142) (0.056) Constant 2.13*** 1.84*** 1.88*** 1.88*** 1.84*** 1.82***  (0.114) (0.074) (0.101) (0.094) (0.094) (0.045)        Observations 162 162 162 162 162 201 R-squared 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression restricting observations to the rounds mentioned in the column heading.   [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  [4] The dependent variable in each column is the buyers’ transfers, averaged over all three auctions of our game.  
 
 
Section C:  Behavior by period and treatment 
 
Table C1: Bids, quality and entry by treatment and period 
 BASELINE LM  MM  HM 
Average Winning Bid (Period 1) 2.14 1.87 1.67 1.91 
Average Winning Bid (Period 2) 1.97 1.60 1.57 1.58 
Average Winning Bid (Period 3) 1.57 1.41 1.24 1.22 
Proportion of High Quality (Period 1) 0.18 0.82 0.77 0.78 
Proportion of High Quality (Period 2) 0.09 0.57 0.49 0.60 
Proportion of High Quality (Period 3) 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.09 
Proportion of Entrants in Period 3 0.61 0.42 0.69 0.67    
Table C2:  Average buyer's transfer, by period and treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
        
Risk aversion 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
LM  -0.27** -0.37*** -0.16 
 (0.113) (0.096) (0.101) 
MM  -0.47*** -0.39*** -0.32** 
 (0.099) (0.096) (0.127) 
HM -0.23** -0.38*** -0.34*** 
 (0.097) (0.098) (0.102) 
Round -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
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Observations 1,007 1,007 1,007 
R-squared 0.195 0.253 0.186 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression using as the dependent variable winning bids in the relevant 
period (column heading).  [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.[4] The dependent variable in this table is the average buyer costs (transfers) over the tree periods.     
Table C3: Quality provision, by period and treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
        
Risk aversion -0.01*** -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
LM  0.51*** 0.55*** 0.10 
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.061) 
MM  0.54*** 0.51*** 0.14** 
 (0.047) (0.067) (0.056) 
HM 0.52*** 0.58*** 0.04 
 (0.045) (0.055) (0.064) 
Round -0.01* -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
    
Observations 1,007 1,007 1,007 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present marginal effects estimates from a (separate) probit model, using as a dependent variable 
a dummy taking the value one whenever the winning firm produced high quality in the relevant period (column 
heading). [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table C4: Quality provision, by period and treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
        
Risk aversion -0.01*** -0.01** -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Winning Bid 
(Period 1) 
0.06   
(0.055)   
Winning Bid 
(Period 2) 
 -0.10**  
 (0.052)  
Winning Bid 
(Period 3) 
  -0.08*** 
  (0.030) 
LM  0.51*** 0.52*** 0.09* 
 (0.046) (0.059) (0.051) 
MM  0.56*** 0.48*** 0.11** 
 (0.056) (0.072) (0.052) 
HM 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.01 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.054) 
Round -0.01 -0.02*** -0.01*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
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Observations 1,007 1,007 1,007 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present marginal effects estimates from a (separate) probit model, using as a dependent variable 
a dummy taking the value one whenever the winning firm produced high quality in the relevant period (column 
heading). [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses.  [3] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Section D:  Additional parametric and non-parametric tests accounting for 
behavioral spillovers within sessions 
 
Table D1: Mann-Whitney tests on quality provision (first two rounds only) 
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 BA vs LM  60 z-stat -4.551 -3.656 -1.953 28 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.051 LM  vs. MM  28 z-stat -0.536 0.656 0.565 40 Prob>|z|  0.592 0.512 0.572 MM vs. HM 40 z-stat 0.952 -0.944 -0.394 34 Prob>|z|  0.341 0.345 0.694 BA vs. MM  60 z-stat -5.565 -3.317 -1.440 40 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.001 0.150 BA vs. HM 60 z-stat -4.554 -4.116 -1.825 34 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.068 LM vs. HM 14 z-stat 0.355 -0.230 0.183 17 Prob>|z|  0.722 0.818 0.855 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
 
 
Table D2:  Mann-Whitney tests on entry (first two rounds only)  
Pairwise comparison Obs Non-par test (z, p) BA vs LM  60 1.510 28 0.131 LM vs. MM  28 -2.277 40 0.023 MM vs. HM 40 -1.080 34 0.280 BA vs. MM  60 -1.062 40 0.288 BA vs. HM 60 -2.059 34 0.040 LM vs. HM 28 -3.089 34 0.002 
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Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
Table D3: Mann-Whitney tests on buyers’ transfers  (first two rounds only) 
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average Periods 1-3 BA vs. LM  60 z-stat 0.92 -2.40 -2.20 -3.08 28 Prob>|z|  0.358 0.017 0.028 0.002 LM vs. MM  28 z-stat 2.24 1.19 0.27 1.82 40 Prob>|z|  0.025 0.263 0.789 0.069 MM vs. HM 40 z-stat -1.86 -1.54 -2.85 -2.45 34 Prob>|z|  0.064 0.124 0.004 0.014 BA vs. MM  60 z-stat 3.46 -1.65 -2.46 -1.52 40 Prob>|z|  0.001 0.099 0.014 0.129 BA vs. HM 60 z-stat 1.12 -3.52 -5.43 -4.13 34 Prob>|z|  0.262 0.000 0.000 0.000 LM vs. HM 28 z-stat 0.25 -0.11 -1.85 -0.57 34 Prob>|z|  0.806 0.915 0.065 0.571 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment.  
Table D4: Quality provision, by period and treatment (first two rounds only)   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods           LM  0.36*** 0.41*** 0.20** 0.60***  (0.052) (0.149) (0.084) (0.172) MM  0.43*** 0.35*** 0.13 0.55***  (0.055) (0.084) (0.097) (0.136) HM 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.18 0.56***  (0.054) (0.075) (0.128) (0.137) Round -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.11** -0.26***  (0.072) (0.055) (0.048) (0.062)      Observations 162 162 162 162 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present marginal effects estimates from a (separate) probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy taking the value one whenever the winning firm produced high quality in the relevant period (column heading). [2] The fourth column presents results of a tobit regression in which the dependent variable is the n. of times high quality has been produced by the winning firm standardized by the n. of periods. [3] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [4] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table D5: Entry, by treatment (first two rounds only)   Period 3     LM  -0.15  (0.103) MM  0.09*  (0.048) HM 0.18***  (0.040) Round -0.10**  (0.045)   Observations 162 
Notes: [1] Reported values are marginal effects from a probit model, using as a dependent variable a dummy taking the value one whenever the Entrant firm entered the Period 3 auction rather than staying out. [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [3] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Table D6: Average buyer's transfer, by period and treatment (first two rounds only)   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average over Periods 1-3           LM  -0.07 0.76*** 0.53** 0.41***  (0.154) (0.116) (0.235) (0.115) MM  -0.39** 0.40** 0.36** 0.12  (0.132) (0.151) (0.148) (0.120) HM -0.10 0.78*** 0.88*** 0.52***  (0.167) (0.153) (0.136) (0.141) Round -0.23*** -0.19 -0.26*** -0.23***  (0.056) (0.123) (0.080) (0.046) Constant 2.67*** 2.48*** 2.26*** 2.47***  (0.136) (0.210) (0.169) (0.126)      Observations 162 162 162 162 R-squared 0.131 0.132 0.191 0.179 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression using as the dependent variable winning bids in the relevant period (column heading). [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.[4] The dependent variable in this table is the average buyer costs (transfers) over the tree periods. 
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Table D7: Mann-Whitney tests on quality provision (group behavior, averaged across 
periods) 
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 BA vs LM  30 z-stat -5.34 -5.37 -3.28 14 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.001 LM  vs. MM  14 z-stat 1.01 1.18 -0.64 20 Prob>|z|  0.311 0.237 0.521 MM vs. HM 20 z-stat -0.12 -1.56 2.28 17 Prob>|z|  0.902 0.120 0.023 BA vs. MM  30 z-stat -5.97 -5.85 -3.46 20 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.001 BA vs. HM 30 z-stat -5.69 -5.72 -1.06 17 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.289 LM vs. HM 14 z-stat 0.65 -0.57 1.96 17 Prob>|z|  0.519 0.570 0.050 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
 
 
Table D8:  Mann-Whitney tests on entry (group behavior, averaged across periods) 
Pairwise comparison Obs Non-par test (z, p) BA vs LM  30 2.88 14 0.004 LM  vs. MM  14 -3.58 20 0.000 MM vs. HM 20 0.44 17 0.657 BA vs. MM  30 -1.91 20 0.056 BA vs. HM 30 -1.15 17 0.248 LM vs. HM 14 -3.13 17 0.002 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment. 
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Table D9: Mann-Whitney tests on buyers’ transfers (group behavior, averaged across 
periods) 
Pairwise comparison Obs   Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average Periods 1-3 BA vs LM  30 z-stat 4.04 -4.11 -4.18 -2.90 14 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 LM  vs. MM  14 z-stat 3.34 0.28 0.82 1.50 20 Prob>|z|  0.001 0.780 0.411 0.132 MM vs. HM 20 z-stat -4.05 -0.76 -2.29 -2.77 17 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.446 0.022 0.006 BA vs. MM  30 z-stat 5.62 -4.39 -3.74 -0.97 20 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.332 BA vs. HM 30 z-stat 3.75 -4.34 -5.07 -3.83 17 Prob>|z|  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 LM vs. HM 14 z-stat -0.99 -0.71 -1.83 -1.35 17 Prob>|z|  0.321 0.475 0.068 0.177 
Notes: [1] Pairwise Mann-Whitney tests reported, using the following labeling conventions:  BA = “Baseline” treatment; LM = “Low Multiplier Bonus” treatment; MM = “Medium Multiplier Bonus” treatment; HM = “High Multiplier Bonus” Treatment.   
Table D10: Quality provision, by period and treatment (averaged across individuals)   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 All Periods           LM  0.30*** 0.28*** 0.11* 0.17***  (0.025) (0.043) (0.058) (0.021) MM  0.29*** 0.25*** 0.14** 0.16***  (0.026) (0.049) (0.062) (0.024) HM 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.05 0.17***  (0.028) (0.040) (0.085) (0.021) Observations 243 243 243 243 
Notes: [1] Columns 1-3 present results from a (separate) tobit model, using as a dependent variable the number of times (averaged over all rounds) in which a winning firm produced high quality in the relevant period (column heading). [2] The fourth column presents results of a tobit regression in which the dependent variable is the n. of times high quality has been produced by the winning firm standardized by the n. of periods (averaged over all periods). [3] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [4] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table D11: Entry, by treatment (averaged across individuals)   Period 3     LM  -0.19  (0.120) MM  0.09*  (0.046) HM 0.06*  (0.035) Observations 243 
Notes: [1] Reported values are results from a tobit model, using as a dependent variable the fraction of times (averaged over all rounds) the Entrant firm entered Period 3 rather than staying out. [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [3] *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Table D12: Buyer's transfer, by period and treatment (averaged across individuals)   (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Average over Periods 1-3           LM  -0.32*** 0.30** 0.37* 0.11  (0.103) (0.128) (0.176) (0.076) MM  -0.49*** 0.32** 0.31** 0.03  (0.078) (0.124) (0.129) (0.100) HM -0.30*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.16  (0.096) (0.130) (0.122) (0.114) Constant 2.21*** 2.01*** 1.60*** 1.96***  (0.052) (0.077) (0.092) (0.075)      Observations 238 241 234 243 R-squared 0.262 0.083 0.145 0.034 
Notes: [1] Each column presents a simple OLS regression using as the dependent variable buyer’s costs (transfers) in the relevant period (column heading). [2] Robust standard errors, clustered by session, appear in parentheses. [3] ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.[4] The dependent variable in this table is the average buyer costs (transfers) over the tree periods. 
 
 
 
  
Theoretical Appendix
1 Structure and Notation
The basic structure of the game consists of a sequence of three auctions. Two Incum-
bent firms enter and compete in all three auctions, while a third firm, the Entrant firm,
may choose to enter and compete in only the third auction. In each of these auctions,
all participating firms submit bids simultaneously. The firm submitting the lowest bid
wins the auction and must produce at one of two quality levels, high or low. Ties
are broken by uniformly randomly selecting the winner from among the set of firms
submitting the lowest bid. Producing high quality is more costly than producing low
quality. Bids are restricted to a discrete finite set, {0, 0.01, ..., b¯}. We assume that any
firm that loses a particular auction earns 0 from that auction and that Incumbents’
earnings come solely from the auctions.
For ease of exposition, we will often omit the term “firm” and simply refer to play-
ers as Incumbent 1, Incumbent 2 and the Entrant. To facilitate comprehension, we
describe the game as proceeding in stages. In Stages 1, 2 and 3, auctions occur. In
Stages 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5, production quality decision are made before all bids as well as
the winning firm’s quality decision are subsequently revealed to all three firms. At
Stage 2.6, the Entrant decides whether to participate in the Stage 3 Auction. This de-
cision is revealed to both Incumbents at the beginning of Stage 3 before any bids are
submitted. This timeline is summarized in Figure 1graphically in Figure 1
Stage = 1
Auction 1
Incumbent
firms bid si-
multaneously
Entrant firm
only observes
1.5
Winning firm
produces
Quality: low
or high
2
Auction 2
Incumbent
firms bid si-
multaneously
Entrant firm
only observes
2.5
Winning firm
produces
Quality: low
or high
2.6
Entry decision
Entrant firm
decides: enter
or stay out
3
Auction 3
Incumbent
firms and En-
trant, if en-
tered, bid si-
multaneously
3.5
Winning firm
produces
Quality: low
or high
Figure 1: Timeline of Dynamic Procurement Auction Game
The other way Entrant firms di↵er from Incumbent firms is in their cost advantage: we give
the Entrant firm a cost advantage in the production of low quality goods to create an e ciency
justification for buyers to prefer entry, so ceL < cL for Entrant firms.
18
We choose a three-stage procurement game to make the experiment as simple as possible while
still allowing for the features in which we are primarily interested. In particular, three is the
minimum number of competitive stages allowing for investing in reputation (Stage 1) and potentially
reaping the gains from such investment (Stage 2) before a new, more e cient firm has the option
of entering the market (Stage 3).
2.2 Treatments
The experiment consists of four di↵erent treatments. The basic structure just outlined is com-
mon to all four treatments. What we vary across treatments is the presence of a reputational
mechanism: three of the treatments involve a formal reputational mechanism while in the fourth
treatment, “Baseline,” no formal reputational mechanism is implemented. Across the three treat-
ments involving a formal reputation mechanism we vary the relative reputation ascribed to Entrant
firms.
2.2.1 Reputation
While producing high quality is relatively costly, it may yield reputational benefits. The essential
characteristic of a reputational benefit is that, holding current stage bids constant, it puts a firm
with good reputation at an advantage relative to competitors with poor reputation. We implement
the reputational benefit in a simple and transparent way: by instituting a direct bid multiplier
analogous to the one studied in Athey et al. (2013) that applies for only one subsequent stage.
Specifically, for t 2 {2, 3}, if the winning Incumbent firm in stage t   1 delivered the high quality
18We limit the price advantage to low quality since an Entrant firm will never optimally choose to produce high
quality—the round ends after the Entrant firm makes its production decision.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Dynamic Procurement Auction Game
The Entrant observes all submitted bids and the production quality decisions of
winning firms for the first two auctions before making its decisi n about whether
to enter Auction 3. For each of the first two auctions it earns an outside wage, w. If
the Entrant decides to not participate in the Stage 3 auction at Stage 2.6, it also earns
this outside wage w in Stage 3, for a total earnings of 3w from the game. If, on the
other hand, the Entrant decides to enter the Stage 3 auction it forgoes the outside wage
associated with Auction 3. Its tot ear ings from the game n this case are 2w plus
whatever it earns from Auction 3.
To analyze the game, we first fix notation. Denote Player i’s bid in Auction t by
bti , where t ∈ {I, II, III}, i ∈ {1, 2, e}. Subscripts i = 1, 2 refer to Incumbent 1 and
1
Incumbent 2, respectively, while the subscript i = e refers to the Entrant. Label the
quality production decision in Auction t by Qti ∈ {H, L}, i ∈ {1, 2, e}, t ∈ {I, II, III},
where H and L mean H(igh) and L(ow) quality, respectively. We include the Entrant to
simplify notation, but note that it can only submit a bid or make a quality production
decision in (at most) Auction 3. Denote by E ∈ {in, out} the Entrant’s decision at
Stage 2.6 about whether to enter into and compete in Auction 3 (E = in) or to stay
out of Auction 3 (E = out). While all of these actions can be conditioned on all prior
information sets, for simplicity we suppress this dependence in our notation.
The primary parameters of interest that are common to all of our treatments are the
(Incumbents’) costs of producing high or low quality, cH and cL, respectively, and the
Entrant’s cost advantage for producing low quality, k. That is to say, the Entrant pro-
duces low quality at a cost of ceL = cL − k and high quality at the common cost cH. We
assume the cost of producing high quality is low enough to be profitable with the max-
imum allowable bid: cH < b¯. The parameters which we vary across our treatments are:
B, the reimbursement multiplier enjoyed by an Incumbent in Auction t, t∈ {2, 3}, con-
ditional on winning Auctions t and t-1 and having produced high quality in Auction
t-1; and β, the reimbursement multiplier enjoyed by the Entrant. Notice that situations
in which an Incumbent or the Entrant has no reimbursement multiplier can also be
described by B = 1 or β = 1, respectively.
To illustrate how the reimbursement multipliers work, we consider the case where
Incumbent 1 wins Auction 1 outright with bid bI1, produces high quality at Stage 1.5
(QI1 = H) and then goes on to win Auction 2 with a bid of b
II
1 and produce low quality
at Stage 2.5 (QII1 = L). In this case, Incumbent 1’s earnings from Auction 1 would
be bI1 − cH while its Auction 2 earnings would be BbII1 − cL. Similarly, if the Entrant
enters Auction 3, wins outright with bid bIIIe and produces low quality, its earnings
from Auction 3 would be βbIIIe − (cL− k), while its total earnings from the game would
be 2w+ βbIIIe − (cL − k). If it does not enter, its earnings from Auction 3 would be w,
and its total earnings from the game would be 3w.
2 Solution Concept
We use the solution concept Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) with the addi-
tional restriction that weakly dominated strategies not be played. To illustrate the type
of behaviors our additional restriction rules out, consider the last auction stage of our
game.
For simplicity, suppose that we are in a subgame following E = out so that Auc-
tion 3 involves only the two Incumbents. Assume Incumbent 1 enters Auction 3 with
a reimbursement multiplier, B > 1. Because our auctions involve simultaneous bid
submission the bids bIII1 =
cL
B b
III
2 =
cL
B + 0.01 are admissible in SPNE because Incum-
bent 2 is indifferent between all of its bids which entail losing the auction. We consider
this outcome to be unreasonable, as it suggests that even very large reimbursement
multipliers do not necessarily confer a competitive advantage.
Forbidding weakly dominated strategies addresses this concern. To see that Incum-
2
bent 2’s strategy is weakly dominated, consider the alternative strategy which replaces
only its Auction 3 bid in the history h leading up to the subgame starting with Auction
3 under consideration. This alternative bid is bˆIII2 = cL. This strategy does at least as
well as the original strategy no matter what the other players do and sometimes it does
better. For example, in the subgame starting at Auction 3 being considered, it does as
well as the original bid against Incumbent 1’s bid—both lose the auction for Incum-
bent 2, resulting in zero additional profits. However, in the same subgame against the
bIII1 =
cL
B + 0.02 it does strictly better, losing and returning zero additional profit. By
contrast, the original Incumbent 2 bid would have won the auction and contributed
strictly negative additional profits along the equilibrium path.
The key feature of the example above is that losing the auction is strictly prefer-
able to winning with such a low bid. It is only the simultaneous-moves nature of the
auction which preserves such non-credible threats in SPNE. Extending this logic, our
restriction on weakly dominated strategies will also rule out submitting a bid at any
auction stage for any history that would result in a negative total subsequent increment
to profits conditional on winning the auction stage. This is a fact we will repeatedly
make use of when characterizing equilibria below.
In the discussion that follows, we will often talk of “profits from a subgame.” By
this, we technically mean the additional profit consequences resulting only from ac-
tions taking place in the subgame. We may also need to refer to profits associated with
one particular auction only, which we will denote by piti , i ∈ {1, 2, e}, t ∈ {I, II, III}.
3 Equilibria in the game without reimbursement multipliers
(Baseline)
To examine equilibria in our game we start from the simplest setting, our Baseline
treatment, where B = β = 1. We start from the post-Auction 3 quality decision (Stage
3.5) and work backwards.
3.1 Stage 3.5: Post-Auction 3 quality decision
As these constitute the last decision nodes of the game, there is no monetary incentive
to produce high quality at the cost cH > cL > cL − k. Consequently, in any subgame
equilibrium all firms choose to produce low quality conditional on winning Auction 3:
QIIIi = L, i = 1, 2, e.
3.2 Stage 3: Auction 3
There are two types of subgames to consider: either the Entrant has entered at Stage
2.6 (E = in) or not (E = out).
3
3.2.1 Subgames following E = out
In subgames starting from nodes in which E = out, Auction 3 involves only the two
Incumbents. Since B = 1, symmetric (Bertrand) competition leads to bids inducing (ap-
proximately) zero profits for both firms. Since both firms choose to produce low quality
following Auction 3, the set of bid pairs that constitute mutual best responses in Auc-
tion 3 consist of: (bIII1 , b
III
2 ) ∈ {(cL, cL), (cL + 0.01, cL + 0.01)}. The resulting expected
profits are (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ,pi
III
e ) ∈ {(0, 0,w), (0.005, 0.005,w)}. Here, “expected” accounts for
the fact that ties are broken with a coin flip.
3.2.2 Subgames following E = in
We turn next to the type of subgame following entry (E = in). The Entrant always has a
cost advantage, k, in producing low quality. In any SPNE of the game the Entrant firm
can win the auction outright with the bid bIIIe = cL − 0.01 since the lowest permissible
bid for either Incumbent here is cL. Assume Incumbent 1 submits the bid bIII1 = cL,
while Incumbent 2 submits any bid bIII2 ≥ cL. With the bid triple (bIII1 , bIII2 , bIIIe ) =
(cL, bIII2 , cL − 0.01), the Entrant guarantees itself a profit of (cL − 0.01) − (cL − k) =
k− 0.01. Assuming k > 0.02 rules out a strictly profitable deviation for the Entrant to
bIIIe = cL.1 Bid triples of the form (bIII1 , b
III
2 , b
III
e ) = (cL + 0.01, bIII2 ≥ cL + 0.01, cL) also
constitute mutual best responses and yield the Entrant a profit of (cL)− (cL − k) = k.
Consequently, along the equilibrium path Auction 3 profits in this type of subgame are
in the set (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ,pi
III
e ) ∈ {(0, 0, k− 0.01), (0, 0, k)}.
3.3 Stage 2.6: Entry decision
The Entrant’s decision hinges on whether the profits it makes from the continuation
game offset the loss of its outside wage. Consequently, the Entrant always chooses
E = in on the equilibrium path whenever k− 0.01 > w and always chooses E = out
on the equilibrium path when k < w. When k ∈ [w,w+ 0.01], the Entrant’s decision
depends on the equilibrium being played, with either E = in or E = out being possi-
ble. For example, if k = w then if the Entrant’s profit from Auction 3 is exactly k on
the equilibrium path, the Entrant is indifferent between entering or not, so that either
decision can occur in equilibrium.
3.4 Stage 2.5: Post-Auction 2 quality decision
Because there is never strategic benefit to producing high quality but there is a cost
(cH > cL), the winning Incumbent always chooses to produce low quality (QIIi = L, i =
1, 2).
1This profitable deviation is ruled out by the condition k − 0.01 > 12 k, where the right-hand side of
this inequality is the largest expected profit the Entrant could receive from the deviation given our tie-
breaking rule. This inequality is satisfied when k > 0.02.
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3.5 Stage 2: Auction 2
Auction 2 involves only the two Incumbents. Symmetric (Bertrand) competition leads
to bids inducing (approximately) zero profits for both firms. Since both firms choose
to produce low quality following Auction 2, the set of bid pairs that constitute mu-
tual best responses in Auction 2 consist of: (bII1 , b
II
2 ) ∈ {(cL, cL), (cL + 0.01, cL + 0.01)}.
Expected Auction 2 profits are therefore (piII1 ,pi
II
2 ) ∈ {(0, 0), (0.005, 0.005)}.
3.6 Stage 1.5: Post-Auction 1 quality decision
Again, because there is never strategic benefit to producing high quality but there is a
cost (cH > cL), the winning firm always chooses to produce low quality (QIi = L, i =
1, 2).
3.7 Stage 1: Auction 1
The analysis is similar to the discussion of Stage 2, above. Auction 1 involves only
the two Incumbents so that symmetric (Bertrand) competition leads to bids inducing
(approximately) zero profits for both firms. Expected profits from Auction 1 are, again,
(piI1,pi
I
2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0.005, 0.005)}.
4 Equilibria in the game with reimbursement multipliers
In this section we characterize the equilibria of our game when Incumbents who pre-
viously produced high quality enjoy a reimbursement multiplier, B > 1. The Entrant
may also enjoy a reimbursement multiplier (β > 1) or may not β = 1. Our analysis of
the case without reimbursement multipliers makes clear that there are often essentially
equivalent subgame equilibria involving bids which differ by ±0.01. For ease of expo-
sition, in this section we typically ignore this type of multiplicity of equilibrium bids.
When Incumbents submit different bids, we generally assume it is Incumbent 1 that
submits the lower bid. We also generally assume that Incumbent 1 has the reimburse-
ment multiplier when discussing cases where one Incumbent has such a multiplier. As
above, we proceed using backwards induction.
4.1 Stage 3.5: Post-Auction 3 quality decision
These constitute the last decision nodes of the game. Therefore, there is no monetary
incentive to produce high quality at the cost cH > cL > cL − k. Consequently, in all
equilibria all firms choose to produce low quality conditional on winning Auction 3:
QIIIi = L, i = 1, 2, e.
4.2 Stage 3: Auction 3
There are two types of subgames to consider: either the Entrant has entered (E = in)
or not (E = out).
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4.2.1 Subgames following E = out
Subgames starting from nodes in which E = out involve only the two Incumbents. If
neither Incumbent enjoys a reimbursement multiplier symmetric (Bertrand) competi-
tion leads to bids that induce (approximately) zero profits for both Incumbents. Since
both firms choose to produce low quality following Auction 3, the analysis here is
identical to the simpler case without reimbursement multipliers above. Consequently,
the bids (bIII1 , b
III
2 ) = (cL, cL) constitute mutual best responses and characterize the sort
of bids submitted in this type of subgame equilibrium. Profits from Auction 3 are
therefore (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ,pi
III
e ) = (0, 0,w), subject to the maintained caveat of the existence of
essentially equivalent subgame equilibria.
If, on the other hand, Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier B > 1, we as-
sume that B is non-trivial in the sense that it confers some competitive advantage.2 In
(subgame) equilibrium, Incumbent 1 always wins the auction. The bid pair (bIII1 , b
III
2 ) =
(cL, cL + 0.01) characterizes bids submitted in this type of equilibrium, yielding Auc-
tion 3 profits of (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ,pi
III
e ) = (cL(B− 1), 0,w).
4.2.2 Subgames following E = in
We turn next to the type of subgame following entry (E = in). Here, we must also
consider the same two broad cases: i) neither Incumbent enjoys a reimbursement mul-
tiplier; or ii) Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier, B > 1.
In the first case, since the Entrant always has a cost advantage k in producing low
quality and low quality is always produced at Stage 3.5, the Entrant can always cer-
tainly win the auction with the bid bIIIe = cL against the bids bIII1 = cL + 0.01 and
bIII2 ≥ cL + 0.01. These bids are mutual best responses and thus can occur along the
equilibrium path, provided the threshold condition β > cL−kcL−0.02 is satisfied.
3 Auction 3
profit resulting from this set of bid triples is (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ,pi
III
e ) = (0, 0, cL(β− 1) + k).
In case ii), where Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement multiplier B > 1, the Entrant
may or may not win the auction. To see this, notice that the Entrant’s zero-profit bid
2The assumption is that B(cL − 0.01)− cL > 12 (BcL − cL), i.e., B > cLcL−0.02 . This condition assures that
Incumbent 1 strictly prefers to underbid Incumbent 2 and win Auction 3 with certainty, rather than just-
matching Incumbent 2’s bid and winning with probability 12 . The condition comes from the inequality
B(cL − 0.01)− cL > 12 (BcL − cL), which rules out the possibility that just-matching Incumbent firm 2’s
bid of cL is a profitable deviation. A similar calculation comparing Incumbent 1’s profit of deviating from
bIII1 = cL to just matching Incumbent 2’s bid of cL + 0.01 yields the threshold condition B >
cL
cL−0.01 which
is obviously satisfied when B > cLcL−0.02 >
cL
cL−0.01 , so that (b
III
1 , b
III
2 ) = (cL, cL + 0.01) are also mutual best
responses. This threshold on B can be thought of as a minimal condition under which the reimbursement
multiplier conveys a competitive advantage, so that we assume it to be satisfied.
3Bid triples (bIII1 , b
III
2 , b
III
e ) in the set {(cL, bIII2 ≥ cL, cL − 0.01)} also constitute mutual best responses
and feature in essentially equivalent subgame equilibria. To rule out a potentially profitable deviation for
the Entrant of bidding one cent higher and winning with probability (at most) one-half in both of these
(essentially equivalent) sets of equilibria, we assume the threshold condition β > cL−kcL−0.02 is satisfied. The
calculation is similar to the calculation in the previous footnote. For example, the Entrant’s profit from
winning outright with a bid of cL = 0.01 is larger than the profit from tying with one Incumbent firm with
a bid of cL when the following inequality is satisfied: β(cL − 0.01)− (cL − k) > 12 (βcL − (cL − k)).
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is governed by the inequality bIIIe =
cL−k
β ≥ 0, while Incumbent 1’s zero-profit bid is
governed by the inequality bIII1 =
cL
B ≥ 0. A larger cost advantage (k) or reimbursement
multiplier (β) lowers the zero-profit bid for the Entrant, while a higher reimbursement
multiplier, B, lowers the zero-profit bid for the Incumbent. Whenever cL−kβ >
cL
B is
satisfied, the Entrant can win Auction 3 with the bid bIIIe =
cL
B , or the bid closest to but
still below this value on our discrete price grid. Assuming this value is in our discrete
price grid, the Entrant’s Aucion 3 profit will be piIIIe = βbIIIe − (cL − k) = β cLB − (cL − k).
If, instead, cL−kβ <
cL
B , Incumbent 1 wins Auction 3 in equilibrium with the bid b
III
1 =
cL−k
β , again assuming this is a feasible bid, and secures a profit of pi
III
1 = B
cL−k
β − cL.
4.2.3 Summary of Stage 3
Summing up, to understand equilibria in the subgames starting from Stage 3, we broke
the analysis into various types of subgames. We considered first the subgames fol-
lowing the Entrant’s decision to stay out (E = out), and subdivided these subgames
further depending on whether or not an Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier,
B > 1. If neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, then they both earn ap-
proximately zero profit from Auction 3 on the equilibrium path, submitting bid pairs
(bIII1 , b
III
2 ) ∈ {(cL, cL), (cL + 0.01, cL + 0.01)}. If, on the other hand, Incumbent 1 has a
reimbursement multiplier, then there is the possibility of a strictly positive profit from
Auction 3 for Incumbent 1. The profit level will be determined by the magnitude of
B. For example, in equilibria with (bIII1 , b
III
2 ) = (cL, cL + 0.01), Incumbent 1’s profit is
piIII1 = BcL − cL = cL(B− 1) > 0.
We next considered subgames following entry (E = in), where the picture was
slightly more complicated. There, equilibrium profits – including who wins the auc-
tion – depend on whether an Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier as well as rela-
tionship between the magnitude of the Incumbent’s reimbursement multiplier (B > 1),
the magnitude of the Entrant’s reimbursement multiplier (β ≥ 1), and the size of the
Entrant’s cost advantage (k > 0). If neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multi-
plier, the Entrant always wins Auction 3 on the equilibrium path by, e.g., submitting
bIIIe = cL and earning profit piIIIe = cL(β− 1) + k. If Incumbent 1 has a reimbursement
multiplier, the Entrant may still win. Specifically, whenever cL−kβ >
cL
B , the Entrant
wins Auction 3 in (subgame) equilibrium with the bid bIIIe =
cL
B and secures a profit of
piIIIe = βbIIIe − (cL − k) = cL( βB − 1) + k. When cL−kβ < cLB , on the other hand, Incumbent
1 wins Auction 3 and earns a profit of piIII1 = B
cL−k
β − cL.
4.3 Stage 2.6: Entry decision
Moving one step backwards, the Entrant must decide whether to enter Auction 3 and
forgo its outside wage, w, or to stay out of Auction 3. A necessary condition for entry
is that the Entrant’s expected profits from entering weakly exceed w. The Entrant’s
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(expected) profits from winning, in turn, depend on whether an Incumbent will have a
reimbursement multiplier as well as the magnitude of this reimbursement multiplier.
If neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, the Entrant can, given as-
sumptions on the magnitude of β and k mentioned above, win Auction 3 with a bid of
bIIIe = cL against a minimum of the Incumbents’ bids equal to cL + 0.01, securing itself
a profit of piIIIe = cL(β− 1) + k. Therefore, a necessary condition for choosing E = in
at Stage 2.6 in this case is: cL(β− 1) + k ≥ w. If, on the other hand, Incumbent 1 has a
reimbursement multiplier B > 1, we characterized the Entrant’s equilibrium Auction
3 profits in this type of subgame as cL(
β
B − 1) + k, yielding the necessary condition for
entry: cL(
β
B − 1) + k ≥ w.4
Comparing these two entry conditions, a couple of things are apparent: since βB <
β, entry is less likely if an Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier; and conditional
on entry, the Entrant’s equilibrium profit is lower when an Incumbent has a reimburse-
ment multiplier In these two entry conditions, therefore, we can explicitly see how the
relative magnitude of an Incumbent’s reimbursement multiplier affects entry. We can
also see how an Incumbent choosing to produce low quality at Stage 2.5 “accomodates”
the Entrant by permitting the Entrant to earn higher profits in equilibrium. Finally, we
also see from these entry conditions how the negative implication of an Incumbent
reimbursement multiplier on entry can be overcome by increasing the Entrant’s reim-
bursement multiplier β, or by increasing the Entrant’s cost advantage k.
4.4 Stage 2.5: Post-Auction 2 quality decision
Assume that Incumbent 1 has won Auction 2 and is deciding whether to incur the ex-
tra cost to produce high quality. The monetary benefit from producing high quality
depends on whether the Entrant chooses to enter Auction 3 (E = in) or not (E = out)
at Stage 2.6. We calculated above that in the case where an Incumbent has a reim-
bursement multiplier B > 1 the Entrant enters and wins Auction 3 (E = in) whenever
cL(
β
B − 1) + k) > w. When this inequality is satisfied, therefore, both Incumbents earn
zero profit from Auction 3 in equilibrium, implying there is no monetary benefit from
producing high quality while there is a monetary cost. As a consequence, Incumbent 1
always chooses QII1 = L in this type of subgame equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, β cLB − (cL − k) < w,5 the Entrant always chooses E = out
at the next decision node along the equilibrium path. In subgames where Incumbent
1 chooses to produce low quality (QII1 = L) and E = out, its subsequent Auction 3
profits are piIII1 = 0,
6 while in subgames following QII1 = H and E = out, its subsequent
Auction 3 profits are piIII1 = cL(B− 1) – assuming B is large enough. Thus, Incumbent 1
decides to produce high quality at Stage 2.5 (QII1 = H) in subgame equilibria featuring
4This assumes cL−kβ >
cL
B . Otherwise, the Entrant loses Auction 3 and earns zero profit in this type of
equilibrium.
5We ignore for the moment the knife-edge case where β cLB − (cL − k) = w.
6Or, as we saw above, they may also be 0.005, depending on which specific subgame equilibrium is
played.
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E = out if the increment to associated cost is less than the increment to associated
monetary benefit. The parameter values for which this is true satisfy the inequality
cH − cL < cL(B − 1), or equivalently, B > cHcL . If this inequality is not satisfied, the
winning Incumbent chooses to produce low quality at Stage 2.5 (QII1 = L).
Overall, if cL(
β
B − 1) + k) > w, then along the equilibrium path QII1 = L. If
β cLB − (cL − k) < w, the winning Incumbent’s quality production decision depends
on the magnitude of the reimbursement multiplier relative to the ratio of the costs of
producing high and low quality. If B > cHcL , then Q
II
1 = H in all (subgame) equilibria.
If, on the other hand, B < cHcL , then Q
II
1 = L in all subgame equilibria.
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4.5 Stage 2: Auction 2
In Auction 2, Incumbents’ bids depend on Auction 3 profits along the equilibrium path.
Which type of equilibrium is being played depends on the parameters of the game. We
consider three cases: i) β cLB − (cL − k) > w; ii) β cLB − (cL − k) < w and cH < BcL; and
iii) β cLB − (cL − k) < w and cH > BcL.
4.5.1 Case i): β cLB − (cL − k) > w
The simplest case is case i, where β cLB − (cL− k) > w. Here, the Entrant chooses E = in
at Stage 2.6 in all subgame equilibria implying that both Incumbents earn zero profit
from Auction 3 and, knowing this, choose to produce low quality at Stage 2.5 (QII1 =
L). If neither Incumbent enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier, the usual
argument implies that the bid pair (bII1 , b
II
2 ) = (cL, cL) constitutes mutual best responses
which yield zero Auction 2 profit (piII1 = pi
II
2 = 0). If Incumbent 1 enters Auction 2
with a reimbursement multiplier, it wins the auction with certainty submitting the bid
bII1 = cL against the bid b
II
2 = cL + 0.01, yielding equilibrium profits in Auction 2 for
Incumbent 1 of piII1 = cL(B − 1) and Auction 2 profits for Incumbent 2 equal to zero
(piII2 = 0). Since Auction 3 profits are zero for both Incumbents, Auction 2 profits in
case i are also the continuation game profits.
4.5.2 Case ii): β cLB − (cL − k) < w and B > cHcL
For these parameter values, as we saw above, the Entrant chooses E = out in equi-
librium at Stage 2.6, while Incumbent 1 wins Auction 2 and produces high quality at
Stage 2.5 (QII1 = H), securing Auction 3 profits of pi
III
1 = cL(B− 1). If neither Incumbent
enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier, because their situation at Stage 2 is
symmetric all subsequent profits are bid away in equilibrium. The zero-profit bid satis-
fies bIIi − (cL(B− 1)− cH) = 0. The bid pair (bII1 , bII2 ) = (cL(B− 1)− cH, cL(B− 1)− cH)
therefore constitutes mutual best responses and features in this type of equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, Incumbent 1 enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement mul-
tiplier B > 1, then it wins Auction 2 outright in subgame equilibrium with the bid
7If cH = BcL, then either QII1 = H or Q
II
1 = L are possible along the equilibrium path.
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bII1 = cL(B − 1) − cH against the bid bII2 = cL(B − 1) − cH + 0.01. The resulting con-
tinuation game profit for Incumbent 1 would be B[cL(B − 1) − cH ] − cH + cL(B − 1),
which is positive whenever (BcL − cH) ≥ cL, or equivalently, whenever B ≥ cL+cHcL . We
assume for simplicity that this condition is satisfied, which implies that the bid pair
constitutes mutual best responses and is played in subgame equilibrium.8 Continua-
tion game profits for Incumbent 2, who loses Auction 2 in this case, are zero.
4.5.3 Case iii): β cLB − (cL − k) < w and B < cHcL
In all subgame equilibria with these parameter values the Entrant chooses E = out at
Stage 2.6 but the Incumbent winning Auction 2 does not produce high quality at Stage
2.5 (QII1 = L). Because of this, subsequent (Auction 3) profits after winning Auction
2 are zero along the equilibrium path. Because there are no future profits to account
for, if neither Incumbent enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier, the bid
pair (bII1 , b
II
2 ) = (cL, cL) constitutes mutual best responses and is played in subgame
equilibrium, yielding Auction 2 profits of (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ) = (0, 0). If, on the other hand,
Incumbent 1 enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier, the bid pair (bII1 , b
II
2 ) =
(cL, cL + 0.01) constitutes mutual best responses and is played in equilibrium, yielding
Auction 2 profits of (piIII1 ,pi
III
2 ) = (cL(B − 1), 0). Because the profits from Auction 3
for both Incumbents in case iii are zero, the Auction 2 profits are also the continuation
game profits.
4.6 Summary of Stage 2
Summarizing the analysis of Stage 2, if the parameters of the game are such that the
Entrant chooses to compete in Auction 3 in equilibrium (β cLB − (cL − k) > w), then
the combined profits from Auction 2 and 3 are either zero for both Incumbents – if
neither incumbent enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier – or cL(B− 1) for
Incumbent 1 and zero for Incumbent 2 otherwise.
If the parameters are such that the Entrant stays out of Auction 3 (β cLB − (cL − k) <
w), then the picture is more complicated. The profits associated with entering Auc-
tion 2 with a reimbursement multiplier depend on the inequality B > cHcL . When it is
satisfied and, moreover, when B ≥ cL+cHcL , then Incumbent 1 can earn a continuation
game profit of B[cL(B− 1)− cH ]− cH + cL(B− 1) in subgame equilibrium when it has
a reimbursement multiplier. If, on the other hand, B < cHcL , then continuation game
profits of cL(B− 1) are possible in equilibrium for Incumbent 1 provided it enters Auc-
tion 2 with a reimbursement multiplier. Incumbents that enter Auction 2 without a
reimbursement multiplier ensure themselves zero continuation game profits.
8If the condition is not satisfied, Incumbent 1 prefers to lose Auction 2 and earn zero subsequent profit
over winning and earning negative subsequent profit. However, knowing this, Incumbent 1 would not
have produced high quality at Stage 1.5. Consequently, when B < cL+cHcL this type of subgame cannot be
part of any equilibrium.
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4.7 Stage 1.5: Post-Auction 1 quality decision
The considerations governing high quality production are by now familiar. If Incum-
bent 1 wins Auction 1 and produces low quality (QI1 = L) at Stage 1.5, then it enters
Auction 2 as a symmetric competitor, ensuring zero continuation game profit. If, on the
other hand, it enters Auction 2 with a reimbursement multiplier by choosing (QI1 = H)
then, depending on the parameters of the game, it can secure continuation game prof-
its of either B[cL(B− 1)− cH ]− cH + cL(B− 1) or cL(B− 1) in (subgame) equilibrium.
The decision to produce high quality will therefore be driven by the comparison be-
tween the increment in cost associated with doing so (cH − cL) and the increment to
profit, either B[cL(B− 1)− cH ]− cH + cL(B− 1) or cL(B− 1).
4.8 Stage 1: Auction 1
Since neither Incumbent enters Auction 1 with a reimbursement multiplier, symmetric
Bertrand competition pushes bids low enough to ensure zero continuation game profit.
The bids submitted in equilibrium therefore depend on the parameters of the game and
the equilibrium being played.
4.9 Summary of equilibria with reimbursement multipliers
Of primary interest for our current study is the constellation of parameter values de-
termining entry and quality provision. For ease of exposition, we will frequently omit
the qualifier “in all subgame equilibria of this type,” although this qualifier should be
understood to apply.
4.9.1 Entry
For entry, the primary consideration is whether an Incumbent has a reimbursement
multiplier at Stage 2.6, i.e., the decision node at which the Entrant must decide whether
to enter or stay out. If neither Incumbent has a reimbursement multiplier, the deci-
sion is somewhat simple: if cL(β − 1) + k ≥ w, then entry can entry occur and defi-
nitely occurs if the inequality is strict; if the inequality is not satisfied, entry definitely
does not occur. In our experiment, we fix some of these parameter values for all treat-
ments: k = 1.375, cL = 1.5, w = 1. Across treatments we vary primarily the Entrant’s
reimbursement multiplier, letting β take values in the set {1, 1.5, 2}. The inequality
cL(β− 1) + k ≥ w is strictly satisfied for all of these values of β given our choices for k,
cL, and w. Consequently, entry always occurs if the winning Incumbent produces low
quality at Stage 2.5.
If, on the other hand, the winning Incumbent produces high quality at Stage 2.5,
entry depends also on the magnitude of the Incumbent’s reimbursement multiplier, B.
In particular, entry can only occur if cL(
β
B − 1) + k ≥ w. In all of our (non-baseline)
treatments, we fix B = 2, so that the inequality becomes cL(
β
2 − 1) + k ≥ w. Plugging
in the other (fixed) parameters, this reduces to 1.5( β2 − 1) + 1.375 ≥ 1. For β = 1 this
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inequality is strictly not satisfied, so that Entry never occurs if high quality is produced
at Stage 2.5. When β = 1.5, the condition holds with equality, so entry is possible
depending on the equilibrium being played. When β = 2, the inequality is strictly
satisfied, implying that entry always occurs even if high quality is produced at Stage
2.5.
4.9.2 Quality
Quality provision is more complicated as it can occur at more than one decision. For
illustration, we focus here on Stage 2.5, as this is the stage that (as we saw) also deter-
mines entry. In this discussion we assume that Incumbent 1 has won Auction 2 and
must therefore decide between QII1 = L and Q
II
1 = H At Stage 2.5.
We noticed above that whenever E = in at the subsequent stage, Incumbent 1 will
always choose QII1 = L. Given our choice of parameter values, when β = 2 entry
occurs irrespective of whether the winning Incumbent produces high quality at Stage
2.5, implying that QII1 = L is certain. When β = 1, the parameters we chose imply
entry never occurs and, consequently, that high quality is always produced QII1 = H.
In the intermediate case where β = 1.5, whether high quality is produced depends on
whether entry occurs in the particular equilibrium being played. When E = in, QII1 = L
is certain, while QII1 = H is certain if the equilibrium being played entails E = out.
In summary, when the Entrant effectively has no reimbursement multiplier (β = 1)
so that it is treated like an Incumbent who (immediately) previously produced low
quality, high quality provision is the most likely. High quality provision is the least
likely when the Entrant enjoys a reimbursement multiplier equivalent to an Incumbent
who immediately previously produced high quality (β = 2). For the intermediate case,
β = 1.5, the likelihood of high quality provision is also intermediate – possible in some
equilibria and impossible in others.
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